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INTRODUCTION 
he number of class actions in the United States with foreign class 
members—alternatively known as global, multinational, interna-
tional, or transnational class actions—has steadily increased in the past 
few years.1 The increase can be attributed to a combination of the global 
presence of multinational corporations2 and the aggressively broad reach 
of American class action attorneys.3 
                                                                                                         
 1. See, most recently, Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) 
(refusing to apply U.S. securities laws in a class action brought by foreign class members 
against a foreign bank). The issue is not new. U.S. courts have been including foreign 
people in class definition for almost half a century. For an earlier example in the area of 
securities litigation class actions, see Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 977–
78 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[T]he suit here is a class action on behalf of thousands of plaintiffs 
preponderantly citizens and residents of Canada, Australia, England, France, Germany, 
Switzerland, and many other countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America.”); 
see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 799 (1985) (brought on behalf of 
a class of about 28,000 members, residing in all 50 States, the District of Columbia, and 
several foreign countries). For earlier examples in the area of mass tort, see, for example, 
In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
The plaintiff class is defined as those persons who were in the United States, 
New Zealand or Australian Armed Forces at any time from 1961 to 1972 who 
were injured while in or near Vietnam by exposure to Agent Orange or other 
phenoxy herbicides . . . . The class also includes spouses, parents, and children 
of the veterans born before January 1, 1984, directly or derivatively injured as a 
result of the exposure. 
Id.; In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 634, 641–42 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (a world-
wide class of women affected by silicone breast implants). A high profile worldwide 
class action was brought on behalf of victims of the Nazi holocaust. See In re Holocaust 
Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). See generally SWISS BANK 
SETTLEMENT, http://www.swissbankclaims.com (last updated Feb. 29, 2012); see also 
Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 138, 139–40 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (a “futures only” 
worldwide class of people affected by allegedly defective heart valves). Needless to say, 
the idea of binding “future class members” creates a new set of obstacles for the recogni-
tion of U.S. class actions abroad. See Isabelle Romy, Class actions américaines et droit 
international privé suisse, AKTUELLE JURISTISCHE PRAXIS [AJP] 783, 796–97 (1999) 
(Switz.). 
  A related issue is the rise of international class arbitration. See S.I. Strong, En-
forcing Class Arbitration in the International Sphere: Due Process and Public Policy 
Concerns, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 53, 89 (2008) (discussing the increasing numbers of 
international class arbitrations and the attendant problems with the international recogni-
tion of class arbitration awards and arguing that, although “parties will likely oppose 
enforcement of international class awards under the New York Convention on due proc-
ess and public policy grounds,” ultimately “international class awards should be given the 
same presumption of enforceability as other international awards”). 
 2. See Hannah Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions under Federal Securities 
Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 16 (2007) 
T 
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Once a judgment is obtained or a settlement is reached in an American 
opt-out class action in which at least some of the class members are for-
eigners, the issue remains whether such judgment will be recognized and 
enforced in foreign courts. If the class action judgment is against the in-
terest of the foreign class members, some foreign courts might not allow 
foreign class members to be bound by such adverse judgment. If the 
class action judgment or settlement is less than the amount foreign class 
members believe they should be entitled to, a foreign court might not 
enforce the result. The question therefore remains whether the class ac-
tion defendant will be able to assert res judicata against the foreign ab-
sent class members in a subsequent proceeding, or whether foreign ab-
sent class members will be able to bring their own individual or class 
action lawsuits abroad. 
This is an important procedural issue for foreign class members as well 
as U.S. courts.4 Yet there are few examples of foreign courts enforcing 
U.S. class action judgments or court-approved settlements.5 This Article 
                                                                                                         
(“The globalization of financial markets has brought about the globalization of securities 
litigation”); George A. Bermann, U.S. Class Actions and the “Global Class,” 19 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 93 (2009) (“The emergence of multinational classes in securities, 
antitrust, and mass tort claims is something we can expect in a world of truly interna-
tional markets.”); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the 
Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
In our world, no formal political state has authority of a scope commensurate 
with modern global business. As a result, our world is one that virtually invites 
regulatory mismatches. The underlying dispute is likely to be global, as might 
well be the desired preclusive scope for litigation. But aggregate litigation nec-
essarily must proceed in some court within some government whose territorial 
authority stops considerably short of the entire globe. 
Id. at 13. 
 3. See Rolf Sturner, International Class Actions from a German Point of View, in 
CURRENT TOPICS OF INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 107 (Mohr Siebeck, Rolf Sturner & 
Masanori Kawano eds., 2009) [hereinafter CURRENT TOPICS] (“American law firms are 
therefore fishing for claimants all over the world with the intention to represent a world-
wide international class in American courts.”). 
 4. See John C. L. Dixon, The Res Judicata Effect in England of a US Class Action 
Settlement, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 134 (1997) (Eng.) (foreign class members need to 
know the consequences of opting out, remaining in, or ignoring a class action notice and 
U.S. courts need to know the binding nature of its class action decree). 
 5. See Andrea Pinna, Recognition and Res Judicata of US Class Action Judgments 
in European Legal Systems, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 31, 38 (2008) (“[T]he specificities of 
[the class action] procedure make it nearly impossible to apply reasoning by analogy, 
simply because European courts have not had the opportunity to rule on similar situa-
tions.”); Bermann, supra note 2, at 96 (“[N]o foreign court has ever addressed the ques-
tion [of foreign class action judgment recognition].”); Marina Matousekova, Would 
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will attempt to answer some of these questions that have confounded 
U.S. courts and commentators. Although this Article’s scope is largely 
limited to the enforceability of U.S. class action judgments and court-
approved settlements in Latin America, the conclusions are applicable to 
all countries, particularly within the civil law tradition. 
Individual U.S. judgments are routinely recognized and enforced in 
Latin America, but class action proceedings present some very specific 
considerations that do not arise in the litigation of individual claims. Be-
cause of these differences, the recognition of U.S. class action judgments 
and settlements presents unique challenges to foreign courts. 
The resolution of this issue may have a significant effect on U.S. class 
action law as well. Many American courts have denied certification of a 
foreign class due to lack of “superiority,” whenever there is a concern 
that the foreign court will not recognize6 the resultant judgment or court-
                                                                                                         
French Courts Enforce U.S. Class Action Judgments?, 2006 CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 651, 
653 (It.) (“the issue of whether an American class action judgment could be recognized 
and enforced in France . . . . has not yet been referred to any French judge”); Jonathan 
Harris, The Recognition and Enforcement of US Class Action Judgments in England, 
2006 CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 617 (It.) (“There is no clear English authority as to whether, 
and in what circumstances, a United States class action judgment is entitled to recogni-
tion and enforcement in England.”); Dixon, supra note 4, at 150 (“The law in this area is 
difficult to analyse as there is no case that has really come close to considering this is-
sue.”); see also In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 242 F.R.D 76, 102–05 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (no authority in England, Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands). But 
see Rechtbank Amsterdam, 23 juni 2010, No. 398833/HA ZA 08-1465 (Stichting Onder-
zoek Bedrijfs Informatie Sobi/Deloitte Accountants B.V.) (Neth.) (where an Amsterdam 
court recognized a U.S. class action judgment as binding upon non-U.S. residents who 
did not opt out of In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., No. Civ.103MD01539, 
2006 WL 132080 (D. Md. Jan. 9, 2006), where the fraudulent acts occurred in the United 
States); Amsterdam Court Recognizes US Class Settlement, STIBBE (June 25, 2010), 
http://www.stibbe.nl/upload/166c3273c01297daa3dd301435.htm; Sturner, supra note 3, 
at 114 (discussing a case in which the State District Court of Stuttgart refused recognition 
of a U.S. class action judgment). 
 6. The Author uses the expression “will not recognize” loosely. There is no uniform 
standard as to how confident a U.S. court must be as to whether the foreign court would 
recognize the potential class action judgment or settlement. Compare Bersch v. Drexel 
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 996 (2d Cir. 1975) (establishing the “near certainty” stan-
dard by holding that an American court need not certify a class action involving foreign 
class members when it is near certain that a foreign court may not recognize or enforce 
the class judgment), with Vivendi, 242 F.R.D. at 95. In re Vivendi Universal established 
the “more likely than not” standard by holding that a court may consider in the certifica-
tion of a class involving foreign class members, whether it is likely or probable that a 
foreign court may recognize and enforce the class judgment, and stating that 
[i]t seems more appropriate, instead, to evaluate the risk of nonrecognition 
along a continuum. Where plaintiffs are able to establish a probability that a 
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approved settlement and the defendant risks possible litigation elsewhere 
regarding the same conflict, even after the U.S. class action has con-
cluded.7 This approach, conditioning class certification on the enforce-
ability of the result abroad, has garnered the support of the International 
Bar Association.8 
                                                                                                         
foreign court will recognize the res judicata effect of a U.S. class action judg-
ment, plaintiffs will have established this aspect of the superiority requirement. 
. . . Where plaintiffs are unable to show that foreign court recognition is more 
likely than not, this factor weighs against a finding of superiority and, taken in 
consideration with other factors, may lead to the exclusion of foreign claimants 
from the class. The closer the likelihood of non-recognition is to being a “near 
certainty,” the more appropriate it is for the Court to deny certification of for-
eign claimants. 
Id. at 95. See generally Matthew H. Jasilli, Note, A Rat Res? Questioning the Value of 
Res Judicata in Rule 23(b)(3) Superiority Inquiries for Foreign Cubed Class Action Se-
curities Litigations, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 114, 121–31 (2009) (discussing several 
standards developed by U.S. courts); Michael P. Murtagh, The Rule 23(b)(3) Superiority 
Requirement and Transnational Class Actions: Excluding Foreign Class Members in 
Favor of European Remedies, 34 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2011) (same); 
Tanya J. Monestier, Transnational Class Actions and the Illusory Search for Res Judi-
cata, 86 TULANE L. REV. 1, 13–20 (2011) (same). 
 7. In the tradition of class action litigation, each actor is behaving in his or her own 
interest. Class counsel wants to include foreign class members to increase the settlement 
value of the claim and, consequently, attorney’s fees. Defendants want to exclude foreign 
class members to reduce the scope of liability and, consequently, the value of the judg-
ment or the settlement value of the claim. See Sturner, supra note 3, at 107–08; see, e.g., 
Vivendi, 242 F.R.D. at 92 (class action on behalf of foreign class members partly dis-
missed for lack of superiority); Mohanty v. Bigband Networks, Inc., No. C 07-5101, 
2008 WL 426250, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2008) (the class representative is not typical). 
See the discussion of forum non convenies in Monestier, supra note 6, at 11 n.24; Bux-
baum, supra note 2, at 35, 39–41 (stating that, out of forty-five class claims involving 
foreign class members in securities class actions, fourteen had generated no specific reso-
lution on the question of subject-matter jurisdiction, sixteen had excluded all foreign 
class members, and fifteen cases included all or some foreign class members. Many of 
the foreign class members were from Canada, a country that has a regulatory scheme that 
is similar to that of the United States, but some involved class members from countries 
which have different legal systems, like the Netherlands, Germany, and France). 
 8. See IBA LEGAL PRACTICE DIV., GUIDELINES FOR RECOGNISING AND ENFORCING 
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS FOR COLLECTIVE REDRESS 13 (Int’l Bar Ass’n ed., 2008) [hereinaf-
ter IBA LEGAL PRACTICE, GUIDELINES] (“It is appropriate for a court to assume jurisdic-
tion over foreign class members if . . . it is reasonable for the court to expect that its 
judgment will be given preclusive effect by the jurisdictions in which the [absent] foreign 
class members . . . would ordinarily seek redress.”). Although the language of the guide-
lines seems to apply only to the situations when the foreign class member prevails and 
“seek[s] redress,” the IBA Task Force was cognizant that the most pressing issue was 
probably when the foreign class members would have their rights precluded. See id. at 
12–13. 
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss whether U.S. courts 
should certify transnational class actions (either with an opt-in or an opt-
out procedure) regardless of the potential recognition of the result in a 
foreign court.9 The objective of this Article is limited to determining 
                                                                                                         
[D]uring its deliberations, the Task Force noted that a request to ‘recognise and 
enforce’ a traditional foreign judgment most commonly occurs when a foreign 
judgment creditor is trying to collect on the judgment. That is, a creditor is 
seeking to enforce an unsatisfied judgment obtained from a foreign country 
against a recalcitrant judgment debtor. However, the Task Force anticipates that 
these Guidelines will only rarely be invoked in those situations. Rather, the 
Task Force contemplates that these Guidelines will be most commonly used in 
situations where the preclusive effect of a foreign judgment will be at issue so 
as to prevent an absent claimant from re-litigating a claim that has been re-
solved by a foreign collective redress judgment. 
Id. 
 9. See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 997 n.48 (proposing an opt-in class action to increase the 
possibility of enforcement abroad of U.S. class action judgments); Debra Lyn Bassett, 
U.S. Class Actions Go Global: Transnational Class Actions and Personal Jurisdiction, 
72 FORDHAM L. REV. 41, 87–89 (2003) (“[T]he opt-in procedure is a superior device from 
a due process perspective.”); Monestier, supra note 6, at 1–2 (proposing the adoption of 
the opt-in device for foreign class members). But see Janet Walker, Crossborder Class 
Actions: A View from Across the Border, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 755, 769–71 [hereinaf-
ter Walker, A View from Across the Border] (stating that an opt-in solution for non-
residents would not solve the problem of fairness to foreign class members). See infra 
Part II.B. (A U.S. Court Cannot Validly Obtain Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Absent 
Plaintiff Class Members). 
  Linda Sandstrom Simard and Jay Tidmarsh propose the abandonment of the con-
sensus that courts should not certify a class action with foreign citizens from countries 
that do not recognize an American judgment. See Linda Sandstrom Simard & Jay Tid-
marsh, Foreign Citizens in Transnational Class Actions, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 87–129 
(2011). According to the authors, the most efficient test is to determine whether or not the 
foreign class member is likely to commence a subsequent foreign proceeding. Using 
standard tools of economic analysis, the authors propose the class action should “include 
foreign citizens with claims that are not individually viable and exclude foreign citizens 
with claims that are viable.” See id. at 87. The idea is not new. It has been argued by 
plaintiff attorneys and commentators. See, e.g., Ilana T. Buschkin, Note, The Viability of 
Class Action Lawsuits in a Globalized Economy—Permitting Foreign Claimants to Be 
Members of Class Action Lawsuits in the US Federal Courts, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1563, 
1595–96 (2005). 
When considering the res judicata concerns introduced by foreign class mem-
bers, few federal judges are factoring in the actual likelihood of repeat litigation 
. . . . The risk that absent foreign class members will sue again in the courts of 
their home countries is often more theoretical than actual . . . . The practical 
difficulties involved in litigating abroad, however, usually make this theoretical 
possibility impracticable. If judges were to weigh these factors more carefully 
when considering certification of a class, in most cases they would discover 
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whether Latin American countries would recognize and enforce a U.S. 
class action judgment or court approved settlement. 
This Article is structured in two parts. In order to illuminate the issues 
behind the recognition of a U.S. class action judgment in Latin America, 
Part I of this Article classifies Latin American countries into four catego-
ries, and discusses the obstacles to recognition of a U.S. class action 
judgment that are applicable to specific Latin American countries ac-
cording to each nation’s individual approach to class action litigation. 
The first category is comprised of countries that do not allow class ac-
tions for damages. Some of the countries in this category may have some 
form of injunctive class actions with varying levels of sophistication.10 
                                                                                                         
that the risk of repeat litigation in foreign courts is minor and does not justify 
exclusion of foreign claimants. 
Id. at 1595–96. There are other compelling arguments that supplement that analysis. For 
example, class actions may not be available abroad and the defendant may not be subject 
to jurisdiction abroad. See also id. at 1569, 1598–99 (stating that, because the objective of 
the small-claim class action is to deter corporate misconduct and preserve investor confi-
dence in the marketplace (global deterrence), not efficiency “courts should adopt a pre-
sumption in favor of including foreign claimants in small claim class action lawsuits”). 
  The perceived unfairness to defendants being exposed to litigation abroad may be 
more theoretical than real for yet another reason: by the time the U.S. class action is set-
tled, the statute of limitations may have precluded any possibility of litigation abroad. See 
Peter L. Murray, Class Actions in a Global Economy, in CURRENT TOPICS, supra note 3, 
at 95, 103; see also Jasilli, supra note 6, at 118–19 (“the binding effect of judgments 
should not be addressed as part of the superiority inquiry of Rule 23(b), but should be 
replaced by the subject-matter inquiry for the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities 
laws.”). 
 10. Most civil law scholars reserve the name “class actions” exclusively for “class 
action for damages” and some only use the expression to designate an “opt-out class ac-
tion for damages.” The many examples of injunctive class actions in their legal tradition 
are not considered “class actions.” See, e.g., Samuel P. Baumgartner, Class Actions and 
Group Litigation in Switzerland, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 301, 316–17 (2006–2007).  
Just because there is no class action device [in Switzerland] does not mean, 
however, that there is no procedural vehicle to allow for group litigation in 
Switzerland. . . . Probably the best known such device is the association suit 
(Verbandsklage in German). [T]he Swiss legislature first introduced the Ver-
bandsklage in the area of unfair competition, granting associations that are 
authorized by their bylaws to pursue the economic interests of their members to 
bring claims of violations of the Unfair Competition Act on behalf of those 
members. However, associations are limited to claiming declaratory relief and 
injunctions to stop the alleged violations. 
Id.; see also infra 139–42 and accompanying text (discussing the tradition in civil law 
scholarship to use different terminology based on immaterial differences of the different 
types of class actions, such as whether they are opt in or opt out, brought by a class mem-
ber or an association, injunctive, or damages). 
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Other countries may have specifically rejected proposals to enact class 
actions for damages. Other countries simply do not have any type of 
class action at all. 
The second category is comprised of countries that do have class ac-
tions for damages in their legal systems, but judgments in such actions 
are only binding if favorable to the interests of the class. In these coun-
tries, the binding effect of settlements is often controversial. 
The third category is composed of countries that have class actions for 
damages, with the final judgment binding on the class regardless of the 
outcome, but these countries adopt a system of opt-in class action proce-
dure. In an opt-in system, absent class members must take affirmative 
steps to include themselves in the class action before they may be bound 
by the judgment. 
The fourth category of Latin American countries is composed of coun-
tries that have a class action system that is substantially similar to the 
U.S. model. The systems may not be exactly the same in all aspects, but 
the differences are not relevant for the purpose of recognition. These 
countries adopt an opt-out class action procedure in which the judgment 
is binding whether favorable or not to the class and also allow class ac-
tion settlements. 
The Latin American countries (or any country for that matter) that fall 
under the first three categories would likely not recognize or enforce a 
U.S. class action judgment or settlement because the peculiarities of each 
country’s class action model present insurmountable obstacles. Because 
the fourth category of countries has a class action device that is substan-
tially similar to the U.S. model, the class action rules alone do not pose 
an obstacle to recognition of an American class action judgment. 
Whether these countries would recognize a U.S. class action judgment 
will depend on other factors, discussed in Part II. 
Part II of this Article discusses general obstacles to recognition of a 
U.S. class action judgment or court approved settlement in all Latin 
American countries, regardless of the particular class action apparatus. It 
argues that, regardless of which of the four categories a Latin American 
country falls into, none of them would recognize or enforce a class action 
judgment or court-approved settlement for at least three additional rea-
sons. 
First, the class action notice to foreign class members will likely be 
deemed inadequate, both under the standards of the specific Latin 
American country and the standards of U.S. class action law. This is the 
case even where the notice is translated with flexibility and the utmost 
sensitivity for the cultural and legal peculiarities of each Latin American 
country, and even where notice is written to be devoid of any legalism 
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and accessible to the Latin American public (itself a very challenging 
hurdle). There is a strong probability that absent class members will sim-
ply not understand the legal implications of the class action notice and 
what it requires of them. Being completely unfamiliar with the American 
class action device, the idea that one must actively exclude oneself from 
a proceeding to which the person was not formally served with process is 
completely alien to the nationals of these countries. 
Second, a U.S. court cannot validly obtain jurisdiction over Latin 
American absent class members that have no contacts with the United 
States. No Latin American country would recognize a U.S. judgment 
(whether it is a class or an individual action) against a national who 
lacked significant contact with the United States and is not subject to 
jurisdiction there, even if the person was to be properly served with 
process through rogatory letter. 
Third, Latin American countries are not likely to recognize a foreign 
judgment that binds their nationals in a proceeding in which they were 
not made parties through formal service of process or notice performed 
through rogatory letters. 
These three obstacles are applicable to all Latin American countries, 
regardless of which of the four categories they fit. 
Finally, this Article concludes that no Latin American country would 
recognize or enforce a U.S. opt-out class action judgment or court ap-
proved settlement which would bind foreign nationals. 
I. OBSTACLES TO RECOGNITION OF A U.S. CLASS ACTION JUDGMENT 
DERIVED FROM SPECIFIC CLASS ACTION RULES 
The various Latin American class action regimes are as diverse as the 
Latin American culture itself. Each country has its own perspective on 
class action litigation, ranging from (a) countries that do not have class 
action for damages, (b) countries where a class action judgment is bind-
ing only if it is favorable to the class, (c) countries that adopt an opt-in 
class action mechanism, and (d) countries that adopt a class action model 
that is substantially similar to the American model. Not only are these 
legal approaches to class action litigation different from one another, but 
they differ significantly from the U.S. system.11 
                                                                                                         
 11. See Ángel R. Oquendo, Upping the Ante: Collective Litigation in Latin America, 
47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 248, 251 (2008–2009) (explaining how Latin American 
legal systems have transplanted the concept of class action litigation from the United 
States and “radically transformed it. They have established causes of action inspired by 
the U.S. class action, but based on autochthonous institutions, in order to creatively proc-
ess group rights. Additionally, they have designed procedural means for the vindication 
of comprehensive guarantees.”). 
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As one might expect, individual countries with unique class action 
rules will review a U.S. class action judgment from different perspec-
tives. These perspectives will influence a nation’s willingness to recog-
nize and enforce the U.S. judgment. 
A. Countries That Do Not Have Class Actions for Damages 
Several Latin American countries, including Venezuela,12 Peru,13 Uru-
guay, Costa Rica,14 El Salvador, Bolivia,15 and the Dominican Repub-
lic,16 do not have class action for damages available within their respec-
tive legal systems.17 Some of these nations may allow for injunctive class 
                                                                                                         
 12. See JUAN ESTEBAN KORODY TAGLIAFERRO, EL AMPARO CONSTITUCIONAL Y LOS 
INTERESES COLECTIVOS Y DIFUSOS (2004) (Venez.) (a book about injunctive class actions 
in Venezuela); Enrique Luis Fermín Villalba, La Cosa Juzgada y Sus Efectos Extensivos 
en las Sentencias Sobre Intereses Difusos y Colectivos en la Jurisprudencia de la Sala 
Constitucional del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia de Venezuela, in CODIGO MODELO DE 
PROCESOS COLECTIVOS: UN DIALOGO IBEROAMERICANO 585 (Antonio Gidi & Eduardo 
Ferrer eds., 2009) (Mex.) [hereinafter UN DIÁLOGO IBEROAMERICANO] (article about 
injunctive class actions in Venezuela). 
 13. See Antonio Gidi, Comentario: Artículo 82 del Código Procesal Civil Peruano, 
in I CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL: COMENTADO “POR LOS MEJORES ESPECIALISTAS” 360–70 
(Johan S. Camargo Acosta ed., 2010) (Peru) (discussing and critiquing the Peruvian class 
action); see also Aníbal Quiroga León, La Proteción de Intereses Difusos y Colectivos en 
la Legislación Peruana y el Proyecto de Código Modelo de Procesos Colectivos para 
Ibero-América, in UN DIÁLOGO IBEROAMERICANO, supra note 12, at 476. 
 14. In a recent project to enact the new Code of Civil Procedure in Costa Rica, Article 
128 would not allow res judicata effect if the judgment was issued based on insufficient 
evidence. CÓDIGO PROCESAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO [ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE CODE], Ley No. 8508 de 4 de abril de 2006, art. 128 (Costa Rica); see infra 
Part I.B. (Countries in Which a Class Action Judgment is Binding Only if Favorable to 
the Class). 
 15. See Diego Rojas & Ariel Morales, Bolivia: Litigation Reference, CR&F ROJAS 
ABOGADOS, http://www.latinlawyer.com/reference/topics/60/jurisdictions/99/bolivia (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 16. See Marcos Peña-Rodríguez, Laura Medina Acosta & Rosa E Díaz Abreu, Do-
minican Republic: Litigation Reference, JIMÉNEZ CRUZ PEÑA, 
http://www.latinlawyer.com/reference/topics/60/litigation (last visited Apr. 23, 2012) (“In 
civil and commercial matters, class actions are not expressly foreseen in the law. In envi-
ronmental and criminal matters as well as in consumer protection actions, non-profit 
organisations or associations or groups of individuals, may pursue a claim when the col-
lective interests have been affected.”). 
 17. The situation in Europe is very similar—although injunctive class actions are 
usually available in Europe, several European countries still do not have class actions for 
damages. See CIVIC CONSULTING (LEAD) & OXFORD ECONOMICS, EUR. COMM’N—DG 
SANCO: EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS 
MECHANISMS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: FINAL REPORT, PART I: MAIN REPORT 20 (2008), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/finalreportevaluationstudypart1-
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actions with varying levels of sophistication. This ranges from a broad 
recognition of injunctive class actions for the defense of the environment 
or consumer to a more limited allowance of injunctive class actions for 
the protection of the public interest, which is derived from the Roman 
popular action (actio popularis).18 
These countries would likely not recognize a U.S. class action judg-
ment because opt-out class actions for damages are alien to their proce-
dural traditions and to do so would be contrary to both due process of 
law and public policy. More specifically, these countries would not ac-
cept that their nationals would be bound by a judgment issued in a pro-
ceeding to which they were not made parties and had no day in court. 
It is a common rule of law that a party can only pursue the party’s in-
dividual interest in court, not the interests of others. A corollary of this 
principle is that a person has the right to decide whether or not to bring a 
lawsuit. These doctrines are embodied in the principles known as prin-
cipio dispositivo in Portuguese, Spanish, and Italian, Dispositionsmaxime 
in German, and nul ne plaide par procureur in French, and could be 
loosely translated as the principles of party control or party autonomy.19 
                                                                                                         
final2008-11-26.pdf (“Almost half ([thirteen]) of EU Member States currently have some 
mechanisms of collective redress, while the others do not.”). The information in the 
European Commission Report includes in the definition of “collective redress” mecha-
nisms that are not a class action for damages, like those in France, Austria, Germany, and 
England. However, it excludes Poland, which enacted a class action statute after 2008, 
but it offers a good overview of the reality in Europe. See id. Annex 8 (listing the type of 
collective redress available in European countries); see also Nagareda, supra note 2, at 
26. The author links the recent development in class action legislation in Europe with the 
integration of European Markets, but this does not explain a similar development in Latin 
America and elsewhere. 
 18. Some Latin American countries may have had popular actions in their legal sys-
tems for more than a century. See JOSÉ CARLOS BARBOSA MOREIRA, A ação popular do 
direito brasileiro como instrumento de tutela jurisdicional dos chamados interesses difu-
sos, in TEMAS DE DIREITO PROCESSUAL (1977) (Braz.) (discussing the Roman actio popu-
laris as injunctive class action); Oquendo, supra note 11, at 271–77; CARLO FADDA, 
L’AZIONE POPOLARE: STUDIO DI DIRITTO ROMANO ED ATTUALE (1894) (It.) (discussing 
the popular action in Roman law). 
 19. These principles have a long pedigree in the history of civil law civil procedure. 
See ARTHUR ENGLEMANN ET AL., A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 179, § 
72 & 389–90, § 105 (Robert Wyness Miller trans. & ed., 1969) (discussing the Disposi-
tionsmaxime since medieval German law and Roman law); LEOPOLD WENGER, 
INSTITUTES OF THE ROMAN LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 80 (Otis Harrison Fisk trans., 1955) 
(discussing the principle in Roman law); see also Baumgartner, supra note 10, at 321 
(discussing the principle of Dispositionsmaxime as a traditional obstacle to class action 
legislation). But see Matousekova, supra note 5, at 673–74 (considering that the French 
principle of nul ne plaide par procureur would not be an obstacle to the recognition of a 
U.S. class action judgment in France). 
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These foundational principles of civil procedure present barriers to 
countries that have yet to adopt the class action device. These old princi-
ples should not discourage a country from adopting class actions in their 
domestic legal systems. Quite the contrary, I have dedicated most of my 
career proposing the adoption of class actions in all civil law countries. 
However, before a country is psychologically and culturally ready to 
adopt a new procedural paradigm, it is impossible to escape from these 
barriers.20 It is difficult to contemplate a country that would recognize 
                                                                                                         
 20. It is commonplace for opponents, particularly those potential class action defen-
dants, to consider class actions unconstitutional for a myriad of reasons, as class actions 
are being discussed in the political process. See, e.g., Roberth Nordh, Group Actions in 
Sweden: Reflections on the Purpose of Civil Litigation, the Need for Reforms, and a 
Forthcoming Proposal, 11 DUKE J. COMP. INT’L L. 381, 384 (2001) (discussing criticisms 
from the industry against the introduction of class actions in Sweden); Richard B. Cap-
palli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continential Europe? A Preliminary Inquiry, 
6 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 217 (1992); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons From 
Abroad, Complexity and Convergence, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2001); Edward F. Sherman, 
Group Litigation under Foreign Legal Systems: Variations and Alternatives to American 
Class Actions, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 401, 401 (2002) (“Other countries have eyed the 
American class action with both admiration and suspicion.”); Baumgartner, supra note 
10, at 310 (“proponents of [class actions] in Switzerland face considerable doctrinal, 
jurisprudential, cultural, and economic objections”); Thomas D. Rowe, Foreword: De-
bates over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective: What Can We Learn From 
Each Other?, 11 DUKE J. COMP. INT’L L. 157 (2001); Michele Taruffo, Some Remarks on 
Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective, 11 DUKE J. COMP. INT’L L. 405, 413–17 
(2000) [hereinafter Taruffo, Remarks on Group Litigation] (discussing European resis-
tance to class actions and the perceived need to prevent the class action Frankenstein 
monster from “penetrating the quiet European legal gardens”); Tiana Leia Russell, Ex-
porting Class Actions to the European Union, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 141 (2010); Stefano M. 
Grace, Strengthening Investor Confidence in Europe: U.S.-Style Securities Class Actions 
and the Acquis Communautaire, 15 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 281 (2006). 
  Opposition to class actions is also derived from a misunderstanding of the reality 
of American civil litigation. See Sherman, supra, 403. 
Horror stories about an overly litigious society, entrepreneurial plaintiff attor-
neys, runaway jury verdicts, abusive class action practices, and legal blackmail 
through meritless suits that drive up business costs are well-known abroad. 
Whether or not such stories convey an accurate picture, most other countries 
view American class actions as a Pandora’s box that they want to avoid open-
ing. 
Id.; Filippo Valguarnera, Legal Tradition as an Obstacle: Europe’s Difficult Journey to 
Class Action, 10 GLOBAL JURIST (2010), available at http://www.astrid.eu/Riforma-
de6/Dossier—C/Valguarnera_Global-Jourist_2_2010.pdf; Baumgartner, supra note 10, at 
315–16, 348–49 (opposition to class action also derived from propaganda of U.S. “tort 
reform movement,” and insensitive behavior of U.S. courts towards legitimate interna-
tional interests.); Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation 
Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 180 (2009) (acknowledging “that the aversion 
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and give preclusive effect to a judgment issued by means of a procedural 
device as exotic as an opt-out class action, when that device does not 
exist in the country’s own legal system.21 
The reason for the absence of class actions in some Latin American 
countries is similar to the resistance of other civil law countries through-
out the world in adopting the device. Those countries struggling with the 
need to adopt such legislation could study the Model Class Action Code 
recently proposed by this Article’s author, and specifically tailored for 
the peculiarities of the civil law tradition.22 
                                                                                                         
to the American-style class action corresponds to sustained critiques of class actions in 
the United States as well,” and mentioning the recent law reforms that “limited the class 
action as an effective vehicle for resolution of mass personal injuries”). 
At bottom, the gulf between the European and American developments in class 
actions and other forms of aggregation reflects a deeper divide than doctrines 
and formal laws alone would reveal. For the civil law countries of continental 
Europe, the resistance to collectivist measures of adjudication is in part a con-
tinuation of what Hayek has termed a “constructivist rationalism”—a deep-
seated belief in the importance of rationalist expertise in top-down administra-
tive decisionmaking. What characterizes the American legal tradition—what 
Hayek in turn would term “spontaneous order”—is the common law attachment 
to the bottom-up competitive evolution of legal rules. 
Id. at 208–09. 
 21. See IBA LEGAL PRACTICE, GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 5 (stating that the Guide-
lines are applicable only in countries that recognize class actions (“collective redress”) in 
their domestic legal system.) 
 22. See generally Antonio Gidi, The Class Action Code: A Model for Civil-Law 
Countries, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 37 (2005) [hereinafter Gidi, The Class Action 
Code]. This project has been translated into several languages and published in several 
countries. See, e.g., Antonio Gidi, Código de Processo Civil Coletivo: Um Modelo Para 
Países de Direito Escrito, 111 REPRO 192 (2003) (Braz.); Antonio Gidi, Il codice del 
processo civile collettivo: Un modello per i paesi di diritto civile, 2 RIVISTA 
TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO E PROCEDURA CIVILE, ANNO LIX FASC. 697 (Alessandro Bar-
zaghi trans., 2005) (It.); Antonio Gidi, Le Code de L’Action Collective: Un Modéle Pour 
les Pays de Droit Civil, in GILBERTE CLOSSET-MARCHAL & JACQUES VAN COMPERNOLLE, 
VERS UNE “CLASS ACTION” EN DROIT BELGE? 147–63 (M. Guy Sohou & Caroline Gilbert 
trans., 2008) (Belg.) (introductory study in Dutch by Stefaan Voet); Antonio Gidi, Códi-
go de Proceso Civil Colectivo: Un modelo para países de derecho civil, 11 REVISTA 
PRACTICA DE DERECHO DE DAÑOS 56 (Adriana León & Joaquín Silguero Estagnan trans., 
2003) (Spain); Antonio Gidi, Código de Proceso Civil Colectivo: Un modelo para países 
de derecho civil, in MEMORIAS XXVI CONGRESO COLOMBIANO DE DERECHO PROCESAL 
601 (2005) (Colom.); Antonio Gidi, Código de Proceso Civil Colectivo: Un modelo para 
países de derecho civil, in EDUARDO OTEIZA, PROCESOS COLECTIVOS 463 (2006) (Arg.); 
Antonio Gidi, Código de Proceso Civil Colectivo: Un modelo para países de derecho 
civil, in 126 REVISTA JURIDICA DEL PERU 93 (2011) (Peru); Antonio Gidi, Código de Pro-
ceso Civil Colectivo: Un modelo para países de derecho civil, in 16 REVISTA VASCA DE 
DERECHO PROCESAL Y ARBITRAJE 753 (2004) (Spain). 
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Naturally, the reason why a U.S. opt-out class action judgment would 
not be recognized or enforced in civil law countries is not simply because 
these countries do not have the same or a substantially equivalent proce-
dural device in their legal system.23 The explanation is more complex.24 
                                                                                                         
 23. See Romy, supra note 1, at 796 (stating that the mere fact that Swiss law does not 
have a procedure similar to the U.S. class action does not mean that such procedure vio-
lates the Swiss public order. It is necessary to investigate whether such representative 
action violates the fundamental principles of the Swiss procedural law). 
International public policy does not prevent a juridical situation created abroad 
to produce effect in the forum simply because the legal institution or the proce-
dure applied do not exist. In other words, the mere fact that a legal rule or a 
procedural tool that does not exist, or even could not be enacted, in the country 
where a foreign judgment is asked to produce its Res Judicata effects, is not 
enough to consider the foreign judgment to be contrary to public policy. The 
application of foreign rules is only contrary to the international public policy of 
the forum if these rules contradict the main, essential and fundamental legal 
principles of the forum. 
Pinna, supra note 5, at 41; Matousekova, supra note 5, at 665 (“the mere fact that such 
actions do not currently exist in French law does not make them incompatible with our 
legal tradition”); Harris, supra note 5, at 639–40 (“Of course, the English court’s own 
rules of civil procedure do not need to be mirrored when it comes to the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments in England.”); Leonardo Greco, A tutela jurisdicional 
internacional dos interesses coletivos, in ESTUDOS DE DIREITO PROCESSUAL 471 (2005) 
(Braz.) (discussing several procedural differences). But see Richard H. Dreyfuss, Class 
Action Judgment Enforcement in Italy: Procedural “Due Process” Requirements, 10 
TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 5, 7–8 (2002) (“Foreign courts are more likely to scrutinize the 
procedural aspects when presented with American judgments resulting from class actions 
because the procedure is unique and, to most legal practitioners in the rest of the world, 
largely unfamiliar.”). 
 24. In the same vein, the mere fact that an opt-out class action exists in a foreign 
country does not mean ipso facto that the courts of that country would recognize a U.S. 
class action judgment. See infra Part I.D. (Countries That Have a Class Action System 
That is Substantially Similar to the United States) (stating that even countries that have a 
class action system substantially similar to the United States will not recognize a U.S. 
class action judgment); see also infra Part II (discussing the reasons). But the opposite 
seems to be the conclusion of Andrea Pinna and Tanya J. Moestier. See Pinna, supra note 
5, at 46, 49, 60. 
The first way of addressing the public policy issue is to verify whether there are 
similar procedural tools in the legal system of the foreign forum. If that is the 
case, the Bersch test is positive and, most of the time, the US court then certi-
fies a class including the relevant absent class members . . . . [T]he recent ini-
tiatives of several European legal systems to introduce class actions or proce-
dural techniques of consolidation of individual judicial application into collec-
tive claims, some by including an opt-out mechanism, tend to indicate that the 
hostility towards class actions is disappearing progressively. This should facili-
tate the recognition, at least in some European legal systems, of US class action 
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For example, as we have seen, most of these countries have allowed 
some sort of “representative litigation” for injunctive claims for several 
decades.25 
Moreover, even though these legal systems do not have an opt-out 
class action, there is a high probability that a U.S. class action judgment 
would be recognized and enforced against the defendant (as opposed to 
the absent class members).26 As long as class action defendants have had 
their day in court according to U.S. law, and as long as enforcement 
would not violate local public policy, none of the objections raised in this 
Article are applicable as to foreign recognition of a U.S. class action as 
against a defendant.27 
                                                                                                         
judgments, since the contrariety to public policy of the forum can hardly be up-
held. 
Id. at 46, 49; see also Monestier, supra note 6, at 43 (“At a very broad level, the more the 
foreign country regime resembles that which exists in the United States, the more likely a 
U.S. court is to conclude that the foreign court would accord preclusive effect to a U.S. 
class judgment.”). Contrary to the position of these authors, as will be seen more fully 
below, even countries that have class action legislation substantially similar to the U.S. 
model will probably deny recognition of a class action judgment issued by a foreign 
court. See infra Part II. 
 25. See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 242 F.R.D 76, 100–05 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007). In addressing the issue of whether its class decree would be recognized abroad, the 
Vivendi court based its decision substantially on whether the laws of several countries 
have procedural devices analogous to the class action device. The court considered that 
countries, like Germany, that did not have any class action equivalent, would not recog-
nize a U.S. class action decree. The court also stated that “the Dutch Legislature has re-
cently enacted class action legislation in other contexts indicating that recognition of a 
judgment in this case would not be contrary to fundamental principles of fairness in 
Dutch law.” Id. at 105. The Court made similar assessment of England, France, and Aus-
tria. See Jasilli, supra note 6, at 114, 128 (strongly criticizing Vivendi for relying in this 
method as based on dubious foundation and stating that “[n]owhere are either analogous 
forms of action or emerging legal norms held out as even reliable, not to mention power-
ful, evidence for assessing the likelihood of foreign recognition of a judgment”); see also 
Harris, supra note 5, at 637. 
English law permits group and representative actions in English courts. The 
availability of such actions in English courts may be an indication that English 
courts will not regard the U.S. class action procedure as so unfamiliar to an 
English court as to warrant a refusal to recognise a US class action judgment. 
Id. 
 26. See Bermann, supra note 2, at 95. It is also entirely possible that foreign courts 
would recognize U.S. class action judgments against U.S. class members. See infra notes 
34–35 and accompanying text. 
 27. See Bermann, supra note 2, at 95 (“Though not impossible, it is hard to imagine 
that foreign courts will consider it fundamentally unfair for the defendant company to 
have had to defend itself in a class action in a U.S. court, if everything else about the 
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The only objection that a class action defendant could raise in a foreign 
court against recognition of a U.S. class action judgment is an argument 
based on mutuality.28 Mutuality is a preclusion doctrine in American 
civil procedure which states that a party can invoke issue preclusion 
against an opponent only if that same party was bound by the judgment 
as well.29 It was traditionally thought that the rules of issue preclusion 
must be symmetric: a third party should not be able to benefit from a fa-
vorable judgment if that third party could not have been prejudiced by an 
unfavorable result.30 However, the mutuality doctrine, which was once 
the general rule in the United States,31 has been largely abandoned.32 
Some civil law courts might initially feel uncomfortable recognizing a 
class action judgment against a defendant when the same judgment 
would not have been recognized against the absent class members had it 
been unfavorable to the interests of the class. Such uneasiness, however, 
is misguided. Most modern civil law systems are accustomed to treating 
unequal parties in ways that compensate for their inequalities and level 
the procedural playing field. For example, in consumer law, civil law 
                                                                                                         
proceeding was proper.”); see also Murtagh, supra note 6, at 8 (“foreign defendants with 
enough contacts with the U.S. to support jurisdiction tend to also have assets in the U.S. 
sufficient to support the enforcement of a judgment in the U.S.”); Sturner, supra note 3, 
at 108 (same). 
 28. See Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 814, 122 
P.2d 892, 895–96 (1942). 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. at 894 (“The estoppel is mutual if the one taking advantage of the earlier 
adjudication would have been bound by it, had it gone against him.”); Comment, Privity 
and Mutuality in the Doctrine of Res Judicata, 35 YALE L.J. 607, 608 (1926) (“The 
estoppel or bar of the judgment operates mutually if the one taking advantage of it would 
have been bound by it, had it gone the other way.”). 
 31. See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912) (“It is a 
principle of general elementary law that estoppel of a judgment must be mutual.”); 
Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 645 (1936). 
[A] person who is not a party or privy to a party to an action in which a valid 
judgment other than a judgment in rem is rendered . . . is not bound by or enti-
tled to claim the benefits of an adjudication upon any matter decided in the ac-
tion. 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 93(b) (1942). 
 32. See Bernhard, 122 P.2d at 895–96 (allowing defensive use of non-mutual issue 
preclusion); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 329, 
348–50 (1971) (same); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (allow-
ing offensive use of non-mutual issue preclusion). 
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countries consider forum selection and arbitration clauses binding on the 
companies that draft contracts of adhesion but not on the consumers.33 
Foreign courts would have an easier time recognizing a class action 
judgment against a strictly American class member (one who is domi-
ciled, acquired the good or service, and suffered damage in the United 
States) than a foreign class member (who is domiciled, acquired the good 
                                                                                                         
 33. Class action defendants raise the same “mutuality” arguments in U.S. courts in 
the hopes of attacking the class certification of transnational classes. The arguments that 
it is substantially unfair to bind class defendants to a class action judgment but not bind 
foreign class members is also deeply rooted in the concepts that support the doctrine of 
mutuality, although we are talking here of a novel concept of “mutuality of claim preclu-
sion,” as opposed to the traditional “mutuality of issue preclusion.” See Bersch v. Drexel 
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 996 (2d Cir. 1975). Stating that the fact that a foreign court 
may not recognize a U.S. class action judgment 
must be considered not simply in the halcyon context of a large recovery which 
plaintiff visualizes but in those of a judgment for the defendants or a plaintiffs’ 
judgment or a settlement deemed to be inadequate. As Judge Frankel stated in 
his order permitting the case to proceed as a class action: if defendants prevail 
against a class they are entitled to a victory no less broad than a defeat would 
have been. 
Id.; see also Walker, A View from Across the Border, supra note 9, at 763, 797. 
[I]t is unfair to purport to bind defendants to a result that some plaintiff class 
members might be free to accept or to reject as they please at some later date. 
To do so would require a defendant to respond to a claim by a class of indeter-
minate size and scope. . . . It is an important feature of fairness to the defen-
dant, if not a requirement of due process, for the court to take into account the 
likely challenges to the preclusive effect of its certification order in defining the 
class. 
Walker, A View from Across the Border, supra note 9, at 763. 
The argument of defendants in resisting class-action lawsuits that include for-
eign investors is that if they, as defendants, are successful, they may still face a 
potential lawsuit in a foreign jurisdiction brought by the absent class plaintiffs. . 
. . [Defendants] argue that the lack of ‘preclusion protection’ amount[s] to a 
due process violation. 
Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities 
Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 480, 482 (2009). Arguably defendant’s 
assertion that it is unfair to certify a class action when the judgment would not be recog-
nized abroad does not come into play when the defendant itself also seeks class certifica-
tion, usually coupled with a global class settlement. Defendants, even those who origi-
nally challenged the certification of a foreign class as unfair, are perfectly content to get 
the settlement approved and deal with the risk of non-enforceability “when, and if, it 
were to develop.” See Monestier, supra note 6, at 29–33 (“[T]he preclusive effect of a 
U.S. judgment abroad is only a problem if the defendant says it is.”); Murray, supra note 
9, at 101–03 (discussing the behavior of the defendant in the Royal Ahold case). 
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or service, and suffered damage abroad),34 because most obstacles raised 
on this Article are not applicable to American class members. After all, 
in such cases, the notice was performed in the United States and the U.S. 
courts had jurisdiction over the American absent class member.35 How-
ever, the question remains as to whether binding a person who was not 
made party to a proceeding would violate the public policy of the recog-
nizing country. 
In any event, between a wholly foreign class and a wholly American 
class, there are several different possibilities, depending on the many 
variables in a specific case, including the domicile of the class member, 
the domicile of the defendant, where the defendant committed the alleg-
edly wrongful act, where the class member interacted with the defendant, 
and where the damage occurred. All these variables significantly affect 
the issues discussed in this Article, including issues of personal jurisdic-
tion, subject matter jurisdiction, and notice. 
B. Countries in Which a Class Action Judgment is Binding Only if Fa-
vorable to the Class 
Brazil’s system of governing class actions for damages is both similar 
to and different from its American counterpart.36 Brazil has a relatively 
mature and sophisticated legislation37 and scholarship on the subject of 
class actions for damages.38 Brazil’s class action system is set forth in the 
                                                                                                         
 34. These types of class members are commonly known as “foreign cubed” or “f 
cubed class,” because the three elements of the transaction are foreign. Choi & Silber-
man, supra note 33, at 466. In securities class actions, it means that foreign investors 
purchased shares of foreign issuers on foreign stock exchanges. Id. For purposes of com-
parison, a class comprised of U.S. domiciliaries who acquired the good or service in the 
United States and suffered damages in the United States, could be called “American 
cubed class” or “a-cubed class.” 
 35. See infra Part II (Obstacles to Recognition of a U.S. Class Action Judgment De-
rived from Traditional Rules) (discussing notice and personal jurisdiction of absent class 
members). 
 36. See Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil: A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 
AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 318–20 (2003) [hereinafter Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil] (discuss-
ing Brazilian class actions in the comparative law context); 
 37. See Lei No. 8078, de 11 de Setembro de 1990, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 11.9.1990 (Braz.) [hereinafter Brazilian Consumer Code]; Lei No. 7347, de 
24 de Julho de 1985, D.O.U. de 25.7.1985 (Braz.). 
 38. See, e.g., MARCELO ABELHA, AÇÃO CIVIL PUBLICA E MEIO AMBIENTE (2003) 
(Braz.); GREGORIO ASSAGRA DE ALMEIDA, DIREITO PROCESSUAL CIVIL COLETIVO 
BRASILEIRO (2003) (Braz.); 4 FREDIE DIDIER JR. & HERMES ZANETI JR., CURSO DE DIREITO 
PROCESSUAL CIVIL. PROCESSO COLETIVO (2011) (Braz.); PEDRO DA SILVA DINAMARCO, 
AÇÃO CIVIL PUBLICA (2001) (Braz.); ELPIDIO DONIZETTI & MARCELO MALHEIROS 
CERQUEIRA, CURSO DE PROCESSO COLETIVO (2010) (Braz.); EURICO FERRARESI, AÇÃO 
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Brazilian Consumer Code, which is a trans-substantive procedural legis-
lation applicable to all types of claims across all substantive law areas.39 
There are several differences between the class action regimes in Bra-
zil and the United States.40 For example, associations and public entities 
are granted standing to sue in Brazil, but not individual class members.41 
This difference between the Brazilian and American models, however, is 
largely insignificant for the purposes of international recognition of U.S. 
                                                                                                         
POPULAR, AÇÃO CIVIL PUBLICA E MANDADO DE SEGURANÇA COLETIVO (2009) (Braz.); LUIZ 
PAULO DA SILVA ARAUJO FILHO, AÇÕES COLETIVAS: A TUTELA JURISDICIONAL DOS 
DIREITOS INDIVIDUAIS HOMOGENEOS (2000) (Braz.); JOSE DOS SANTOS CARVALHO FILHO, 
AÇÃO CIVIL PUBLICA (6th ed. 2007) (Braz.) [hereinafter FILHO, AÇÃO CIVIL PUBLICA]; LUIZ 
MANOEL GOMES, JR., CURSO DE DIREITO PROCESSUAL CIVIL COLETIVO (2008) (Braz.); 2 
ADA PELLEGRINI GRINOVER, KAZUO WATABABE & NELSON NERY JR., CODIGO BRASILEIRO 
DE DEFESA DO CONSUMIDOR COMENTADO PELOS AUTORES DO ANTEPROJETO (2011) (Braz.); 
MARCIO FLAVIO MAFRA LEAL, AÇÕES COLETIVAS: HISTORIA, TEORIA E PRATICA (Sergio 
Antonio Fabris ed., 1998) (Braz.); RICARDO DE BARROS LEONEL, MANUAL DO PROCESSO 
COLETIVO (2002) (Braz.); PEDRO LENZA, TEORIA GERAL DA AÇÃO CIVIL PUBLICA (2d ed. 
2005) (Braz.); RODOLFO DE CAMARGO MANCUSO, AÇÃO CIVIL PUBLICA (2004) (Braz.); 
HUGO NIGRO MAZZILLI, A DEFESA DOS INTERESSES DIFUSOS EM JUIZO (2007) (Braz.) [he-
reinafter MAZZILLI, A DEFESA DOS INTERESSES DIFUSOS EM JUIZO]; HUMBERTO DALLA 
BERNARDINA DE PINHO, A NATUREZA JURIDICA DO DIREITO INDIVIDUAL HOMOGENEO E SUA 
TUTELA PELO MINISTERIO PUBLICO COMO FORMA DE ACESSO A JUSTIÇA (2002) (Braz.); 
ELTON VENTURI, PROCESSO CIVIL COLETIVO (2007) (Braz.); JOSE MARCELO MENEZES 
VIGLIAR, TUTELA JURISDICIONAL COLETIVA (1999) (Braz.); LIONEL ZACLIS, PROTEÇÃO 
COLETIVA DOS INVESTIDORES NO MERCADO DE CAPITAIS (2007) (Braz.); TEORI ALBINO 
ZAVASCKI, PROCESSO COLETIVO (2007) (Braz.). 
 39. See Brazilian Consumer Code, art. 110 (providing that class actions are applicable 
to the judicial protection of any group right). 
 40. Class actions in Brazil have attracted considerable attention in the English lan-
guage scholarship. See Keith S. Rosenn, Procedural Protection of Constitutional Rights 
in Brazil, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1009, 1031–33 (2011); Roger W. Findley, Pollution Con-
trol in Brazil, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 38–52 (1988); Antonio Herman V. Benjamin, Group 
Action and Consumer Protection in Brazil, in GROUP ACTIONS AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION 141, 141–55 (Thierry Bourgoignie ed., 1992); Oquendo, supra note 11, at 
250; Manuel A. Gómez, Will the Birds Stay South? The Rise of Class Actions and Other 
Forms of Group Litigation across Latin America, 43 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2012) (manuscript at 42–54), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1930413. The Brazilian class action may have influenced 
the ALI’s Principles of Aggregate Litigation and its novel concept of the indivisibility of 
the class action remedy (or of the class substantive right) as a criterion to determine the 
right to opt out. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04, at 118–29 
(2010); see also Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil, supra note 36, at 311, 350–54 (discussing 
the indivisibility of class claims from a comparative perspective and suggesting that 
“[r]ecognition of the concept of indivisible class claims would be an important evolution 
in American class action law. . . . [F]or example, to decide whether there should be a 
right to ‘opt out’ of the class or not.”). 
 41. Brazilian Consumer Code, art. 82. 
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class action judgments. The most important difference, and the one that 
is relevant to this Article, is that Brazilian class action judgments are 
binding only to the extent that they are favorable to the interests of the 
class members.42 
An examination of the Brazilian class action model is important be-
cause it has been replicated by several other Latin American countries.43 
Further, it was the basis for the Model Class Action Code for Latin 
America, sponsored by the Ibero-American Institute of Civil Procedure.44 
1. A Peculiar Approach to Res Judicata in Latin American Class Actions 
Article 103 of the Brazilian Consumer Code regulates the res judicata 
effect of class actions in Brazil.45 The statute prescribes that a class ac-
tion judgment shall bind all members of the class, but the judgment can-
not prejudice the individual rights of absent class members.46 Therefore, 
the class judgment does not bind individual class members unless it is 
favorable to the class.47 
Put simply, if the class action is decided in favor of the group, all ab-
sent members of the class benefit from the decision. If the class action is 
decided against the group, however, the class members are not bound by 
                                                                                                         
 42. See id. art. 103. 
 43. See infra I.B.3. (The Peculiar Res Judicata Model is Followed by Some Latin 
American Countries). 
 44. See Ada Pellegrini Grinover, Kazuo Watanabe & Antonio Gidi, Código Modelo 
de Procesos Colectivos para Iberoamérica, 9 REVISTA IBEROAMERICANA DE DERECHO 
PROCESAL 251 (2006) (Arg.) [hereinafter Grinover, Watanabe & Gidi, Código Modelo de 
Procesos Colectivos para Iberoamérica]. Although the Author was a co-reporter of the 
Ibero-American Class Action Code, he distances himself from the adoption of this type of 
res judicata regime. In other opportunities, both prior to and after the enactment of the 
Ibero-American Class Action Code, he manifested his opinion in favor of a “whether 
favorable or not” approach to class action judgments, as long as supported by judicial 
control of adequacy of representation, judicial approval of class action settlements, ade-
quate notice, and the right to opt out, among other guaranties of fairness to absent class 
members. See Gidi, The Class Action Code, supra note 22, at 47 (providing, in Article 18 
of the Author’s own proposed Class Action Model Code that “[r]es judicata shall bind 
both the class and its members whether the judgment is favorable or not [to the class]”); 
ANTONIO GIDI, RUMO A UM CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL COLETIVO 286–99 (2008) (Braz.) 
[hereinafter GIDI, RUMO A UM CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL COLETIVO] (critiquing the Brazil-
ian model of res judicata and discussing the Author’s proposal of the Class Action Model 
Code). 
 45. See Brazilian Consumer Code, art. 103. 
 46. Id. 
 47. This rule is in sharp contrast to the American class action. See generally Geoffrey 
C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1849 (1998). 
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the decision and may still go to court to pursue their individual rights in 
individual actions. The only impact of a decision adverse to the class is 
that the same class action cannot be brought again, but class members 
may sue individually. 
According to the Brazilian class action statutes, only the benefits from 
the class decree are extended to the individual absent members—these 
members cannot be prejudiced by an unfavorable decision.48 Civil law 
scholars call this situation an extension in utilibus (from the Latin “use-
ful”) of the class decree, because it happens only when the decree is fa-
vorable to the interest of the group.49 It is also known as res judicata 
secundum eventum litis, a Latin expression that means that the ultimate 
effect of the class judgment would depend on the outcome of the litiga-
tion, or more specifically, whether the class won or lost the action.50 In 
common law terminology, it could also be called “one-way preclusion.”51 
The idea of a res judicata secundum eventum litis in Brazilian class ac-
tion is derived from a rather famous debate in Italian civil procedure 
scholarship in the 1970s. At a time when Italian scholars were enamored 
with the American class action, some Italian scholars came to believe 
that res judicata secundum eventum litis would serve as an Italian solu-
tion to the difficulties of adopting class actions in the Italian legal sys-
tem.52 Other Italian academics were against such a proposal.53 The Bra-
zilian scholars who drafted the Brazilian class action law adopted the 
Italian scholars’ res judicata secundum eventum litis concept.54 
                                                                                                         
 48. See Brazilian Consumer Code, art. 103, paras. 1–2. 
 49. See the seminal article of Ada Grinover, one of the academic co-authors of the 
Brazilian Consumer Code. Ada P. Grinover, Da Coisa Julgada no Código de Defesa do 
Consumidor, 33 REVISTA DO ADVOGADO 8 (1990) (Braz.) [hereinafter Grinover, Da 
Coisa Julgada no Código de Defesa do Consumidor]. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil, supra note 36, at 388 (proposing that terminol-
ogy). 
 52. Andrea Proto Pisani, Appunti preliminari per uno studio sulla tutela giurisdizion-
ale degli interessi collettivi (o più esatamente: superindividuali) innanzi al giudice civile 
ordinario, in LE AZIONI A TUTELA DEGLI INTERESSI COLLETTIVI 284–86 (Vittorio Denti ed., 
1976) (It.) [hereinafter LE AZIONI A TUTELA]; Giorgio Costantino, Brevi note sulla tutela 
giurisdizionale degli interessi collettivi davanti al giudice civile, DIR. E GIUR. 235 (1974); 
Vittorio Denti, Relazione introdutiva, in LE AZIONI A TUTELA, supra, at 18; Michele Taruf-
fo, Intervento, in LE AZIONI A TUTELA, supra, at 330–36. 
 53. Mauro Cappelletti, Appunti sulla tutela giurisdizionale di interessi collettivi o 
diffusi, in LE AZIONI A TUTELA, supra note 52, at 205–06; VINCENZO VIGORITI, INTERESSI 
COLLETTIVI E PROCESSO: LA LEGITTIMAZIONE AD AGIRE 111–12, 127–28 (1979) (It.). 
 54. See Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil, supra note 36, at 324–25, 404 (“The Brazilian 
class action traces its origins to academic papers delivered in Italy in the 1970s, when a 
group of Italian scholars began studying American class actions.”). 
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Class members in a Brazilian class action have only a single opportu-
nity to pursue class litigation. Should the group prevail, all individual 
absent class members will benefit from the favorable decision. If the 
group loses, however, only the right to litigate collectively on behalf of 
the group will perish, and only additional class action litigation on the 
same controversy is precluded. In this respect, the class judgment is 
binding on the group as a whole, whether favorable or not. However, 
individual rights stemming from the same controversy are not precluded, 
and the absent class members retain the opportunity to sue individually 
to vindicate their individual rights. Moreover, absent class members are 
not bound by any findings made in the class action, since there is no con-
cept of issue preclusion in Brazil.55 
Res judicata secundum eventum litis was adopted in Brazil because in-
terested persons are not necessarily made parties to a class action, given 
a direct day in court, or personally informed of the action’s existence. 
The Brazilian legislature therefore considered it acceptable that an indi-
vidual benefit from the class decree, but not be prejudiced by it. After all, 
there are no compelling reasons for excluding absent class members from 
the benefits of a successful class action, but the Brazilian legislature be-
lieved that important due process guarantees might be violated or im-
paired should an adverse decision have a preclusive effect.56 
This unnecessarily complex class action res judicata rule is well-settled 
in Brazil.57 Several Brazilian scholars and courts consider it a violation 
                                                                                                         
 55. Issue preclusion is a controversial topic in U.S. class action litigation. See Anto-
nio Gidi, Issue Preclusion Effect of Class Certification Orders, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 
1028–56 (2012) [hereinafter Gidi, Issue Preclusion] (discussing the issue preclusive ef-
fect of class certification orders); Antonio Gidi, Loneliness in the Crowd: Why Nobody 
Wants Opt-Out Class Members to Assert Offensive Issue Preclusion Against a Class De-
fendant (forthcoming 2012) (on file with the author) (discussing the use of offensive 
issue preclusion by opt-out class members). 
 56. See generally Grinover, Da Coisa Julgada no Código de Defesa do Consumidor, 
supra note 49. 
 57. There are literally dozens of law review articles and books about res judicata in 
Brazilian class actions. See, e.g., Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil, supra note 36, at 397; 
RENATO ROCHA BRAGA, A COISA JULGADA NAS DEMANDAS COLETIVAS (2000) (Braz.); 
IBRAHIM ROCHA LITISCONSÓRCIO, EFEITOS DA SENTENÇA E COISA JULGADA NA TUTELA 
COLETIVA (2002) (Braz.); MOTAURI CIOCCHETTI DE SOUZA, AÇÃO CIVIL PÚBLICA (2003) 
(Braz.); RONY FERREIRA, COISA JULGADA NAS AÇÕES COLETIVAS (2004) (Braz.); NILTON 
LUIZ DE FREITAS BAZILONI, A COISA JULGADA NAS AÇÕES COLETIVAS (2004) (Braz.); 
ROBERTO CARLOS BATISTA, COISA JULGADA NAS AÇÕES CIVIS PÚBLICAS (2005) (Braz.); 
JÚLIA MARIA MILANESE BUFFARA, COISA JULGADA NAS DEMANDAS COLETIVAS (2005) 
(Braz.); LUIZ RODRIGUES WAMBIER, SENTENÇA CIVIL: LIQUIDAÇÃO E CUMPRIMENTO 
(2006) (Braz.); CHRISTIANINE CHAVES SANTOS, AÇÕES COLETIVAS E COISA JULGADA 
(2006) (Braz.); RODOLFO DE CAMARGO MANCUSO, JURISDIÇÃO COLETIVA E COISA 
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of due process to bind an absent class member whose individual rights 
were negatively impacted by a class action of which they were not made 
party to by service of process and did not have an opportunity to be heard 
personally about their interests.58 
Brazil recently had an opportunity to reconsider its exotic class action 
judgment rule. In 2003, this Article’s author proposed a new class action 
law by which a judgment, whether favorable or not, would bind all ab-
sent class members.59 Several other proposals followed, all of which 
chose to maintain the Brazilian approach to class action res judicata with 
some minor changes.60 In 2009 the Brazilian federal government pro-
                                                                                                         
JULGADA (2007) (Braz.); JOSÉ ROGÉRIO CRUZ E TUCCI, LIMITES SUBJETIVOS DA EFICÁCIA 
DA SENTENÇA E DA COISA JULGADA CIVIL (2007) (Braz.); CAMILO ZUFELATO, COISA 
JULGADA COLETIVA (2011) (Braz.); see also Oquendo, supra note 11, at 282–83, discus-
sing the 
complex set of res judicata rules . . . . The judgments in these actions, conse-
quently, have extremely asymmetrical res judicata effects. When the plaintiff 
seeks to enforce [damages], the purported beneficiaries profit from a victory, 
but do not have to endure the consequences of a defeat. . . . [And class mem-
bers] usually also benefit from a favorable determination, but are not bound by 
an unfavorable outcome. 
Id. 
 58. See generally Grinover, Da Coisa Julgada no Código de Defesa do Consumidor, 
supra note 49. 
 59. See Gidi, The Class Action Code, supra note 22, at 47 (providing, in Article 18 of 
the Author’s own proposed Class Action Model Code that “[r]es judicata shall bind both 
the class and its members whether the judgment is favorable or not [to the class].”). The 
Author’s proposal is discussed in GIDI, RUMO A UM CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL COLETIVO, 
supra note 44, at 286–99. Other Brazilian scholars have also proposed a shift to a res 
judicata whether-favorable-or-not standard, but mostly for reasons of fairness to the de-
fendant and procedural economy. See, e.g., José Ignácio Botelho de Mesquita, Na ação 
do consumidor, pode ser inútil a defesa do fornecedor, 33 REVISTA DO ADVOGADO 81 
(1990) (Braz.); José Rogério Cruz e Tucci, Código do Consumidor e processo civil: As-
pectos polêmicos, 671 REVISTA DOS TRIBUNAIS 35, 39 (1991) (Braz.); LEAL, supra note 
38, at 209–12; ALUISIO GONÇALVES DE CASTRO MENDES, AÇÕES COLETIVAS NO DIREITO 
COMPARADO E NACIONAL 261–63 (2002) (Braz.); DINAMARCO, supra note 38, at 104–06; 
Luiz Norton Baptista de Mattos, A litispendência e a coisa julgada nas ações coletivas 
segundo o Código de Defesa do Consumidor e os anteprojetos do Código Brasileiro de 
Processos Coletivos, in DIREITO PROCESSUAL COLETIVO E O ANTEPROJETO DE CÓDIGO 
BRASILEIRO DE PROCESSOS COLETIVOS 194, 207 (Ada Pellegrini Grinover, Aluisio Gon-
çalves de Castro Mendes & Kazuo Watanabe eds., 2007) (Braz.) [hereinafter DIREITO 
PROCESSUAL COLETIVO]. 
 60. See, for example, the projects spearheaded by Ada Pellegrini Grinover and Alu-
isio Gonçalves de Castro Mendes. See generally ALVARO LUIZ VALERY MIRRA, 
PARTICIPAÇÃO, PROCESSO CIVIL E DEFESA DO MEIO AMBIENTE 500–11 (2011) (Braz.) (dis-
cussing the res judicata rules of some but not all of the projects). 
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posed Bill 5139, which would create a new class action statute.61 The 
Bill maintained the current approach to class action res judicata, with one 
significant change: it provided that class action judgments have binding 
effect, whether favorable or not, only when the decision is based on is-
sues of law, not issues of fact or evidence.62 In 2009, Brazilian Congress 
enacted Law 12016 regulating a class action against acts of the govern-
ment and no changes were made or proposed to the peculiar Brazilian 
class action res judicata rule.63 
Therefore, a U.S. class action judgment or court-approved settlement 
will only be recognized in Brazil if the result benefits the interests of the 
absent class members. Accordingly, if the plaintiff class prevails in the 
U.S. class action, individual class members may enforce such judgment 
in Brazil. If the plaintiff class does not prevail in the United States, indi-
vidual class members will not be negatively precluded and will remain 
free to litigate their claims in Brazil on an individual or class basis.64 
Similarly, the terms of a class settlement will not bind those class mem-
bers who are dissatisfied with them, and such class members are not pre-
cluded from bringing an individual action to litigate anew the settled 
claims. 
Rhonda Wasserman has addressed the problem of inconsistent recogni-
tion of U.S. class action judgments and court-approved settlements 
                                                                                                         
 61. See Projeto de Lei No. 5139, de 29 de Abril de 2009 (pending Determination of 
Appeal in the Officers of the House of Representatives (MESA)) (Braz.), available at 
http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=432485. 
 62. See id. art. 25. Although the Author participated in the drafting of this project, the 
Author distances himself from the idea that it makes sense to distinguish issues of law 
from issues of fact or evidence for purposes of res judicata. This choice assumes that 
issues of law are obvious and easily ascertainable by courts, independently of an adequate 
representative and adequate maturity of the discussion, whereas issues of fact and of evi-
dence are not. As it is well known by all who follow the developments on mass litigation, 
the first years of litigation are plagued by uncertainties of issues of fact, evidence, and in 
many cases, novel issues of law as well. Therefore, it is common for the first lawsuits to 
be decided against the interest of the plaintiffs. As the litigation gradually “matures,” the 
uncertainties fade away and the plaintiffs start to be successful. See Francis E. McGov-
ern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 659 (1989). 
 63. See Lei No. 12016, de 7 de Agosto de 2009, art. 22, D.O.U. de 7.8.2009 (Braz.), 
available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2007-2010/2009/lei/l12016.htm; 
see also GOMES ET AL., COMENTÁRIOS À NOVA LEI DO MANDADO DE SEGURANÇA 197–211 
(2009) (Braz.); ANDRE VASCONCELOS ROQUE & FRANCISCO CARLOS DUARTE, MANDADO 
DE SEGURANÇA 168–77 (2011) (Braz.); Antonio Herman Benjamin & Gregório Assagra 
de Almeida, Comentários ao artigo 22, in MAIA FILHO ET AL., COMENTÁRIOS À NOVA LEI 
DO MANDADO DE SEGURANÇA 294–329 (2010) (Braz.); see also CASSIO SCARPINELLA 
BUENO, DIREITO PROCESSUAL CIVIL 268–69 (2010) (Braz.); HERMES ZANETI JR., O 
“NOVO” MANDADO DE SEGURANÇA COLETIVO (2012) (Braz.). 
 64. Greco, supra note 23, at 471. 
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abroad in a different context.65 According to Wasserman, in addition to 
the issue of recognition, American courts should also consider the level 
of preclusive effect a foreign court would grant to the class action re-
sult.66 Wasserman further states that “even if a foreign court were to rec-
ognize an American class action judgment, the defendant could face a 
risk of relitigation if the judgment were not accorded robust preclusive 
effect.”67 She concludes, “[i]t is not enough for American courts enter-
taining motions to certify transnational class actions to determine 
whether an American judgment will be recognized abroad. They also 
need to determine the preclusive effects, if any, that the judgment will 
have if it is recognized abroad.”68 
2. Class Representatives Have No Authority to Settle and Compromise 
the Rights of Absent Class Members 
In general, Brazilian class actions are initiated by the office of the pub-
lic prosecutor or by associations.69 Class members do not have standing 
to bring class actions in Brazil. Brazilian class actions are therefore simi-
lar to parens patriae standing and associational standing in the United 
                                                                                                         
 65. See Rhonda Wasserman, Transnational Class Actions and Interjurisdictional 
Preclusion, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313, 314–15 (2011). 
In considering [the] argument against certification [of a class of foreign nation-
als], American courts often use judgment recognition and preclusion terminol-
ogy interchangeably. They discuss the “possibility” that a foreign court may not 
recognize a judgment and the fear that an American class action judgment 
“might not be given preclusive effect in foreign courts” as though recognition 
and preclusion analyses are identical. But they are not. 
Id. 
 66. See id. at 316, 325–28 (“American courts are conflating what should be a two-
step analysis into one. They should be asking, first, would the foreign court recognize the 
American class action judgment? And second, if it would, what preclusive effect, if any, 
would the American class action judgment have in the foreign court?”). 
 67. See id. at 316. 
 68. See id. at 379. 
 69. There has been some field research about which type of class representative is 
more active, associations or the office of the public prosecutor. See PAULO CEZAR 
PINHEIRO CARNEIRO, ACESSO À JUSTIÇA: JUIZADOS ESPECIAIS CÍVEIS E AÇÃO CIVIL 
PÚBLICA. UMA NOVA SISTEMATIZAÇÃO DA TEORIA GERAL DO PROCESSO (2d ed. 2003) 
(Braz.); see also Luiz Werneck Vianna & Marcelo Baumann Burgos, Entre Princípios e 
Regras: Cinco Estudos de Caso de Ação Civil Pública, 48 DATA RIO DE JANEIRO 777, 
782 (2005) (Braz.), available at http://www.scielo.br/pdf/dados/v48n4/28479.pdf; 
CENTRO BRASILEIRO DE ESTUDOS E PESQUISAS JUDICIAIS [CEBEPEJ] & BANCO MUNDIAL, 
TUTELA JUDICIAL DOS INTERESSES METAINDIVIDUAIS: AÇÕES COLETIVAS (Sept. 2007) 
(Braz.). 
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States.70 Most other Latin American countries have standing doctrines 
similar to the Brazilian model.71 
The powers of the Brazilian class representative are very limited. Since 
the substantive rights of the class do not belong to the representative but 
to the group as a whole, a class representative cannot freely dispose of 
the group’s rights. These rights are considered “inalienable rights” 
(“direitos indisponíveis”). Therefore, representatives are allowed to make 
only peripheral concessions over how the defendant may adjust its be-
havior in response to the class proceeding. Most Brazilian scholars agree 
that class representatives in Brazil lack broad powers for negotiating a 
settlement of the group’s rights.72 Therefore, according to the few Brazil-
                                                                                                         
 70. See Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil, supra note 36, at 382–84 (discussing parens 
patriae and associational standing in the United States and comparing it to the Brazilian 
class action). 
 71. See generally Oquendo, supra note 11, at 262–71; Gómez, supra note 40 (manu-
script at 30–83). But see Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 20, at 193–95 (“The interests of 
nonprofit consumer organizations may reflect ideological considerations that may not 
necessarily coincide with the economic interests of consumers.”). 
 72. See Paulo Cezar Pinheiro Carneiro, A proteção dos direitos difusos através do 
compromisso de ajustamento de conduta, 6 LIVRO DE ESTUDOS JURÍDICOS 234 (1993) 
(Braz.); Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil, supra note 36, at 341–44; Fernando Grella Vieira, 
A Transação na Esfera de Tutela dos Interesses Difusos e Coletivos: Compromisso de 
Ajustamento de Conduta, in AÇÃO CIVIL PÚBLICA 224–26, 238–40 (Édis Milaré ed., 
2001) (Braz.) [hereinafter AÇÃO CIVIL PÚBLICA 2001]; ANTONIO AUGUSTO MELLO DE 
CAMARGO FERRAZ, ÉDIS MILARÉ & NELSON NERY JR., A AÇÃO CIVIL PÚBLICA E A TUTELA 
JURISDICIONAL DOS INTERESSES DIFUSOS 43–44 (1984) (Braz.); CELSO ANTÔNIO PACHECO 
FIORILLO, MARCELO ABELHA RODRIGUES & ROSA MARIA BARRETO BORRIELLO DE 
ANDRADE NERY, DIREITO PROCESSUAL AMBIENTAL BRASILEIRO 174–79 (1996) (Braz.); 
FRANCISCO SAMPAIO, NEGÓCIO JURÍDICO E DIREITOS DIFUSOS E COLETIVOS 101–20 (Lumen 
Juris ed., 1999) (Braz.); Marcelo Dawalibi, Limites subjetivos da coisa julgada em ação 
civil pública, in AÇÃO CIVIL PÚBLICA 2001, supra, at 538–42; Édis Milaré, A Ação Civil 
Pública em Defesa do Ambiente, in AÇÃO CIVIL PÚBLICA 193, 225–29, 255–56 (Édis 
Milaré ed., 1995) (Braz.) [hereinafter AÇÃO CIVIL PÚBLICA 1995]; LUIS ROBERTO 
PROENÇA, INQUÉRITO CIVIL 123–25, 138–40 (2001) (Braz.); PINHO, supra note 38, at 170; 
ADRIANO PERÁCIO DE PAULA, DIREITO PROCESSUAL DO CONSUMO 48–49, 238–240, 290–
94 (2002) (Braz.); FILHO, AÇÃO CIVIL PÚBLICA, supra note 38, at 221–22; GEISA DE ASSIS 
RODRIGUES, AÇÃO CIVIL PÚBLICA E TERMO DE AJUSTAMENTO DE CONDUTA 4, 51–52, 59–
62, 112, 122–23, 142–59, 176–80, 189, 207–08, 236 (2d ed. 2006) (Braz.); Daniel Fink, 
Alternativa à ação civil pública ambiental (reflexões sobre as vantagens do termo de 
ajustamento de conduta), in AÇÃO CIVIL PÚBLICA 2001, supra, at 118–22; MAZZILLI, A 
DEFESA DOS INTERESSES DIFUSOS EM JUÍZO, supra note 38, at 375–77, 385–86, 391–94, 
540–41; HUGO NIGRO MAZZILLI, O INQUÉRITO CIVIL 361–62, 375–76, 392–94 (2d ed. 
2000) (Braz.); Hugo Nigro Mazzilli, Compromisso de ajustamento de conduta—Análise à 
luz do Anteprojeto do Código Brasileiro de Processos Coletivos, in DIREITO PROCESSUAL 
COLETIVO, supra note 59, at 231, 238–42; MANCUSO, AÇÃO CIVIL PÚBLICA, supra note 38, 
at 316–39; PAULO DE TARSO BRANDÃO, AÇÃO CIVIL PÚBLICA 127–35 (1996) (Braz.); 
2012] U.S. CLASS ACTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 919 
ian scholars that have addressed the issue, a class settlement agreement 
does not bind absent members who disagree with its terms and the same 
class action (or individual actions) may be brought again to protect the 
rights of the dissatisfied members.73 Therefore, the courts of Brazil will 
not permit the rights of absent class members to be negatively impacted, 
whether by foreign judgment or by a foreign court’s approval of a set-
tlement. 
Most Latin American class action statutes simply do not contemplate 
the settlement of class claims, leaving uncertainty as to whether the class 
representative can freely negotiate a settlement on behalf of the group.74 
3. The Peculiar Res Judicata Model Followed by Some Latin American 
Countries 
Several Latin American countries adopt a class action model that is 
somewhat similar to the unique model followed in Brazil. As a matter of 
fact, they are directly derived from the Brazilian model.75 
                                                                                                         
VIGLIAR, supra note 38, at 137–41, 165–66; ABELHA, supra note 38, at 93–96; LENZA, 
TEORIA GERAL DA AÇÃO CIVIL PÚBLICA, supra note 38, at 77–85; MARCELO PAULO 
MAGGIO, CONDIÇÕES DA AÇÃO 115–16 (2005) (Braz.); LEONEL, supra note 38, at 323–27, 
348–49; GOMES, supra note 38, at 163–71; ZAVASCKI, supra note 38, at 78–79, 151–54; 
GREGÓRIO ASSAGRA DE ALMEIDA, CODIFICAÇÃO DO DIREITO PROCESSUAL COLETIVO 
BRASILEIRO 94–95, 118, 125, 155 (2007) (Braz.); GREGÓRIO ASSAGRA DE ALMEIDA, 
DIREITO PROCESSUAL COLETIVO BRASILEIRO 545–46 (2003) (Braz.); ROBSON RENAULT 
GODINHO, A PROTEÇÃO PROCESSUAL DOS DIREITOS DOS IDOSOS 85–86 (2007) (Braz.); 
DIDIER & ZANETI, supra note 38, at 305–08. Only a minority of scholars believe that rep-
resentatives possess a large amount of power relating to settlement. See PATRICIA 
MIRANDA PIZZOL, LIQUIDAÇÃO NAS AÇÕES COLETIVAS 149–53, 211 (1998) (Braz.); PAULO 
DE BESSA ANTUNES, A TUTELA JUDICIAL DO MEIO AMBIENTE 128–32 (2005) (Braz.). 
 73. See MAZZILLI, A DEFESA DOS INTERESSES DIFUSOS EM JUÍZO, supra note 38, at 166; 
Marcelo Dawalibi, Limites Subjetivos da Coisa Julgada em Ação Civil Pública, in AÇÃO 
CIVIL PÚBLICA 2001, supra note 72, at 526, 538–42. 
 74. There are exceptions. Some class action legislation in Latin America does specifi-
cally provide for class action settlement. See, e.g., L. 472, agosto 6, 1998, Diario Oficial 
[D.O.] 43.357, arts. 56, 61 (Colom.) (providing that a class action judgment or settlement 
binds class members who do not request to opt out). In Mexico and Panama, the law 
clearly states that a class action may be resolved by settlement, but does not state clearly 
its binding effect on class members. However, since both of them specifically provide for 
court approval of the settlement and in both of them the court must determine whether the 
interests of the absent class members are adequately protected, it is only natural that 
court-approved class action settlements have the same binding effect as a class action 
judgment. See Código Federal de Procedimientos Civiles [CFPC] [Federal Civil Proce-
dure Code] art. 595, as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 30 de Agosto de 
2011 (Mex.); Ley 45, de 31 de Octobre de 2007, art. 129.7 (Pan.). 
 75. See supra Parts I.B.1. (A Peculiar Approach to Res Judicata in Latin American 
Class Actions) (discussing the Brazilian approach to class action res judicata). 
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In Chile, Article 54 of the Consumer Protection Law provides that 
judgments in favor of the plaintiff class bind all those who were harmed 
by the defendant’s conduct.76 According to the statute, the binding effect 
is limited to a favorable decision that “declares the defendant’s liabil-
ity.”77 Comparatively, even though Peru has only injunctive class ac-
tions, according to Article 82.6 of the Civil Procedure Code, only a fa-
vorable class action judgment will bind absent class members.78 Mean-
while, Costa Rica does not even have class actions.79 It currently only 
allows individual lawsuits to be consolidated.80 However, a recent bill 
proposing a new Code of Civil Procedure seeks to create a class action 
mechanism by providing that a judgment in a class action for damages 
will only have binding effect if favorable to the class.81 In the case of an 
unsuccessful class action, class members would not be bound and may 
bring their own individual lawsuits.82 
Some Latin American countries were influenced by an older Brazilian 
class action res judicata rule. According to Article 16 of Law 7347 of 
1985 (largely modified by the class action res judicata rule enacted with 
the Consumer Code in 1990), injunctive class action judgments would 
bind all absent class members, unless the judgment was in favor of the 
defendant due to a lack of evidence.83 In the case of dismissal due to lack 
of evidence, any representative may bring the same class action lawsuit, 
with the same cause of action, as long as new evidence is produced.84 
This former Brazilian rule was adopted in article 194 of the Código 
Procesal Civil Modelo para Iberoamerica, a model code enacted by the 
Iberoamerican Civil Procedure Institute. From the Model Code, it mi-
grated to the Uruguayan Code. Even though Uruguay has only injunctive 
                                                                                                         
 76. Law No. 19496, Marzo 7, 1997, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], art. 54 (Chile). 
 77. Id. 
 78. CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL [CÓD. PROC. CIV.] [CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE], Law No. 
10 de 1 de agosto de 1993, art. 82.6 (Peru), available at 
http://www.iberred.org/sites/default/files/codigo-procesal-civil-per.pdf. 
 79. See CÓDIGO PROCESAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO [ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE CODE], Ley No. 8508 de 4 de abril de 2006 (Costa Rica). 
 80. See id. art. 48. 
 81. See Proyecto de Codigo General, Expediente No. 15979, de 11 de agosto de 2005, 
art. 128.3 (Costa Rica). 
 82. See id. art 128.3; see also Sergio Artavia Barrantes, La Protección de los Intere-
ses de Grupo en el Proyecto del Código Procesal General de Costa Rica, in UN DIÁLOGO 
IBEROAMERICANO, supra note 12, at 568, 575–76 (discussing a previous class action bill 
in Costa Rica in which there would be no res judicata effect, if a class action judgment 
was obtained through lack of evidence). 
 83. See Lei No. 7347, de 24 de Julho de 1985, art. 16, D.O.U. de 25.7.1985 (Braz.). 
 84. Id. 
2012] U.S. CLASS ACTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 921 
class actions, according to article 220 of the Código General del Proceso, 
there is no res judicata effect if a class action proceeding fails due to lack 
of evidence.85 
Therefore, even if any of Chile, Peru, or Costa Rica would recognize a 
foreign judgment in a class action for damages, it would probably do so 
only to the extent that the class judgment is favorable to the interests of 
absent class members, or if in Uruguay, only if the judgment was not 
based on lack of evidence. 
The Model Class Action Code for Latin America, sponsored by the 
Ibero-American Institute of Civil Procedure, substantially adopts the new 
Brazilian rule on res judicata.86 Since previous model codes approved by 
the Ibero-American Institute of Civil Procedure have been extremely in-
fluential in Latin America, it is possible that the Model Class Action 
Code for Latin America will set the tone for the enactment or reform of 
class action laws in Latin America.87 
A similar type of class action preclusive effect also exists in an injunc-
tive class action in Germany88 and Switzerland.89 
                                                                                                         
 85. This model was also adopted on the Portuguese class action. See Lei No. 83/95, 
art. 19.1, de 31 de Agosto de 1995, DIARIO DA REPUBLICA [D.R.], no. 201, de 31.08.1995 
(Port.). 
 86. See Grinover, Watanabe & Gidi, Código Modelo de Procesos Colectivos para 
Iberoamérica, supra note 44. Although the Author was a co-reporter of the Ibero-
American Class Action Code, he distances himself from the adoption of this type of res 
judicata regime. In other opportunities, both prior to and after the enactment of the Ibero-
American Class Action Code, I manifested my opinion in favor of a “whether favorable 
or not” approach to class action judgments, as long as supported by judicial control of 
adequacy of representation, judicial approval of class action settlements, adequate notice, 
and the right to opt out, among other guaranties of fairness to absent class members. See 
Gidi, The Class Action Code, supra note 22, at 47 (providing, in article 18 of my own 
proposed Class Action Model Code that “[r]es judicata shall bind both the class and its 
members whether the judgment is favorable or not [to the class] . . . .”); GIDI, RUMO A UM 
CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL COLETIVO, supra note 44, at 286–99 (critiquing the Brazilian 
model of res judicata and discussing my proposal of the Class Action Model Code). 
 87. See Ada Pellegrini Grinover, Novas Tendências em Matéria de Legitimação e 
Coisa Julgada nas Ações Coletivas, in ADA PELLEGRINI GRINOVER & PETRONIO CALMON, 
DIREITO PROCESSUAL COMPARADO 499 (2008) (Braz.). 
 88. See Wasserman, supra note 65, at 350 (describing the German model); Sturner, 
supra note 3, at 110 (same). 
 89. See Baumgartner, supra note 10, at 325–26. 
[T]he judgment in a Verbandsklage [injunctive class action brought by an asso-
ciation] has res judicata effect between the suing association and the defendant, 
but not between the defendant and individual members of the association [or 
other associations, who may bring the same injunctive class action again]”. 
However, the judgment in a Verbandsklage is likely to have binding effects be-
tween defendant and individual members (and between defendant and other as-
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C. Countries That Adopt an Opt-In Class Action 
Although a very popular model in Europe, only one Latin American 
country adopts an opt-in class action mechanism: Mexico. In Mexico, 
absent class members must opt into the class action in order to be able to 
participate in the class action judgment.90 Without the affirmative step of 
opting into the class action, absent class members in Mexico are not 
bound by any class action judgment or court approved settlement.91 Cu-
riously, absent class members may opt in even after the judgment is is-
sued.92 Therefore, presumably class members will only opt into a class 
action when they agree with its outcome. This peculiarity makes the 
Mexican class action strikingly similar to the Brazilian res judicata rule 
described above because, in practice, only a favorable class action judg-
ment will impact class members.93 It is also painfully similar to the old 
practice of “one-way intervention” of the spurious class actions before 
the 1966 amendment to Rule 23.94 
The Author participated in all discussions related to the drafting of the 
Mexican Class Action Act, enacted in 2011.95 The Consulting Group ap-
                                                                                                         
sociations) as a practical matter because neither may want to risk new litigation 
on the same claim, most likely with the same outcome. 
Id. 
 90. See CFPC, as amended, arts. 594, 605, DO, 30 de Agosto de 2011 (Mex.) 
(amending the Mexican Federal Civil Procedure Code to include a title dedicated to class 
action). 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See supra Part I.B. (Countries in Which a Class Action Judgment Is Binding only 
if Favorable to the Class). 
 94. The short-lived practice of one-way intervention was the subject of much aca-
demic attention, in spite of its little practical importance. Proposed Amendments to Rules 
of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105–06 (1966) 
(Advisory Committee’s Notes on FED. R. CIV. P. 23); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work 
of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 
HARV. L. REV. 356, 385–86 (1967); Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision 
of Rule 23, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 818, 829 n.50 (1946) [hereinafter Federal Class Actions]; 
see ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 275, 278–80 (1990); FLEMING 
JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 500–01 (1965); Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, 
The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 710–14 (1940); 
Note, Developments in the Law—Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1395–96 (1976); 
see also Kenneth W. Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 97, 
121–26 (1974). 
 95. See Alberto Benítez, Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor & Antonio Gidi, Iniciativa de 
Reforma al Código Federal de Procedimientos Civiles, in UN DIÁLOGO 
IBEROAMERICANO, supra note 12, at 447 (proposing the original draft of what would later 
become the Mexican class action law). The legislation in Mexico is too recent and there 
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pointed by the Mexican Senate debated the merits of opt-in and opt-out 
class action legislation several times, leading to heated discussion. The 
original class action initiative presented by the Drafting Committee sug-
gested an opt-out class action.96 Moreover, the Consulting Group was 
specifically alerted to the fact that the inertia in the use of an opt-in pro-
cedure would tend to keep classes very small, therefore minimizing the 
power of the device and, as a result, the power of the people.97 However, 
the Mexican Senate succumbed to a powerful lobby of major corpora-
tions and chose an opt-in system.98 
                                                                                                         
is no case law or scholarship on the subject, but a few articles were written before its 
enactment. See, e.g., Lucio Cabrera Acevedo, La Legitimación Para Actuar en Juicio de 
las Asociaciones Privadas en México Especialmente en Matéria Ambiental, in UN 
DIALOGO IBEROAMERICANO, supra note 12, at 555; EDUARDO FERRER MAC-GREGOR, 
JUICIO DE AMPARO E INTERES LEGITIMO: LA TUTELA DE LOS DERECHOS DIFUSOS Y 
COLECTIVOS (2d ed. 2004) (Mex.); Luis Alfredo Brodermann Ferrer, Los Efectos de la 
Sentencia en las Acciones de Grupo en México, 63 ALEGATOS 335 (2006); see also LAS 
ACCIONES PARA LA TUTELA DE LOS INTERESES COLECTIVOS Y DE GRUPO (José Ovalle 
Favela ed., 2004) (Mex.) [hereinafter LAS ACCIONES PARA LA TUTELA] (the fact that no 
Mexican authors published an article in this 2004 book is evidence that the subject was 
almost unknown in Mexico until immediately before the enactment of the class action 
legislation). 
 96. See Benítez, Mac-Gregor & Gidi, supra note 95. This was the initial project 
commissioned by the Mexican Senate. The final statute that was ultimately enacted is 
substantially different in relevant parts. 
 97. Empirical research has substantially validated what most people already knew: 
only a small percentage of class members actually opt out and even a smaller amount will 
bring their own individual lawsuit. See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY 
OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 52–53 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1996) (“In all four districts, the 
median percentage of members who opted out was either 0.1% or 0.2% of the total mem-
bers of the class and 75% of the opt-out cases had 1.2% or fewer class members opt 
out.”); JAY TIDMARSH, MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE CASE STUDIES 11 
(Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1998) (providing number of class members who opted out of mass tort 
settlement class actions); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs 
and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 1529, 1532, 1559–60 (2004) (“Opt-outs . . . are rare: on average, less than 1 [%] of 
class members opt-out.”). 
 98. Disclaimer: together with Professors Alberto Benítez and Eduardo Ferrer Mac-
Gregor, the Author was one of the three academic drafters of the class action bill that led 
to the enactment of the Mexican Class Action Statute. However, the Author has no re-
sponsibility for its ultimate contents. The adoption of an opt-in class action regime as 
well as many other misguided choices and traps for the unwary that will make the Mexi-
can class action largely ineffectual in practice was a political decision and the Mexican 
Senate carries the sole responsibility before the Mexican people. Several important as-
pects of the project we originally proposed were later abandoned in the political process. 
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This opt-in avenue seems to be a common tragic path in class action 
legislation throughout the civil law world, particularly in Europe. Ini-
tially, good-intentioned bills propose an opt-out class action, only to have 
the idea blocked by the legislature in a crude illustration of the political 
process. For example, the original proposal for the Swedish opt-in class 
action was originally devised as an opt-out device.99 The Scottish Law 
Commission’s proposal was to adopt an opt-in class action, although it 
was clear from its report that the proposal was originally drafted as an 
opt-out mechanism.100 In England, in November 2008, the Civil Justice 
Council proposed a transsubstantive opt-in/opt-out class action.101 In July 
2009, the British Ministry of Justice rejected this proposal.102 
Indeed, several civil law countries, mostly in Europe, employ an opt-in 
class action, such as Sweden,103 Italy,104 Finland,105 Poland,106 Russia,107 
                                                                                                         
 99. See Nordh, supra note 20, at 399–400. 
 100. See SCOTTISH LAW COMM’N, MULTI-PARTY ACTIONS 21–28, 33–37 (1996). 
 101. See CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, “IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE THROUGH 
COLLECTIVE ACTIONS”: DEVELOPING A MORE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE PROCEDURE FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTIONS—FINAL REPORT (John Sorabji et al. eds., Nov. 2008) (U.K.) [here-
inafter IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/at800175_imp
roving_access.authcheckdam.pdf. The report was largely based on an extensive report 
written by Rachael Mulheron, Reform of Collective Redress in England and Wales: A 
Perspective of Need, in IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra, at 97–102. 
 102. See Ministry of Justice, The Government’s Response to the Civil Justice Coun-
cil’s Report: “Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions” 11, ¶ 35 (July 
2009) (U.K.), available at www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/government-response-
cjc-collective-actions.pdf; Rachael Mulheron, The Case for an Opt-Out Class Action for 
European Member States. A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 409 
(2009) [hereinafter Mulheron, Opt-Out]; Rachael Mulheron, Justice Enhanced: Framing 
an Opt-Out Class Action for England, 70 MOD. L. REV. 550 (2007). 
 103. See 14 § LAG OM GRUPPRÄTTEGÅNG (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2002:599) 
(Swed.) (“A member of the group who does not give notice to the court in writing, within 
the period determined by the court, that he or she wishes to be included in the group ac-
tion shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the group.”). The Swedish law is consid-
ered a model in Europe, for those who favor an opt-in model. However, in terms of popu-
lation and social equality Sweden is considerably different from other major European 
countries, like Italy, France, England, Ukraine, Spain, Poland, Russia, or Germany. It 
would be understandable if Monaco or Liechtenstein (each with a population smaller than 
40,000) would adopt an opt-in class action, but the same recipe cannot work well in Rus-
sia (population of 142 million) or Germany (population of 81 million). 
 104. See Codice del consumo [Consumer Code], art. 140-bis, amended 2009 (It.) (stat-
ing that the class judgment will bind only those who enroll in the class); Claudio Con-
solo, É Legge una Disposizione Collettiva Risarcitoria: Si è Scelta la Via Svedese Dello 
‘Opt-in’ Anziché Quella Danese Dello ‘Opt-out’ e il Filtro (‘l’Inutil Precauzione’), 25 IL 
CORRIERE GIURIDICO 5 (2008) (It.) (discussing the enactment of an opt-in class action in 
Italy, rather than an opt-out class action). See generally Angelo Dondi, On Some Draw-
2012] U.S. CLASS ACTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 925 
and Japan.108 This seems to be the European Commission preference as 
well, at least for the moment.109 
Only a few European countries, such as Portugal110 and the Nether-
lands,111 have adopted the opt-out model. Belgium attempted to adopt an 
                                                                                                         
backs in the Italian Road to Class Actions, 12 ZZP INT’L 13 (2007) (It.) (general criticism 
to the then recently enacted Italian class action statute); Michele Taruffo, La Tutella 
Collettiva: Interessi in gioco ed Esperienze a Confronto, 2007 RIV. TRIM. DIR. PROC. CIV. 
529 (2007) (It.); CLAUDIO CONSOLO, PAOLO BUZZELLI, MARCO BONA & PAOLO A. 
BUZZELLI, OBIETTIVO CLASS ACTION: L’AZIONE COLLETTIVA RISARCITORIA (2008) (It.); 
Elisabetta Silvestri, The Italian ‘Collective Action for Damages’: An Update (2008) (un-
published paper) (It.), available at 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Italian_Collective_Act
ion_for_Damages.pdf; Andrea Giussani, Enter the Damage Class Action in European 
Law: Heading towards Justice on a Bus, 28 CIV. JUST. Q. 132 (2009); see also Dreyfuss, 
supra note 23, at 34–36 (Italian courts may not recognize the class action binding effect 
on “class members who did not participate personally in the action”). 
 105. See 8 § RYHMÄKANNELAKI (13.4.2007/444) (Fin.) (“A class member as defined, 
who has delivered, within the time limit, a written and signed letter of accession to the 
class shall belong to the class.”). 
 106. See Ustawa o dochodzeniu roszczen w postepowaniu grupowym [Class Actions 
Law], DZIENNIK USTAW 7 § 44, Dec. 17, 2009 (Pol.); Magdalena Tulibacka1 & Radoslaw 
Goral, An Update on Class Actions and Litigation Funding in Poland (Nov. 2011) (un-
published paper), available at 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Polish%20civil%20jus
tice%20updatePDF.pdf (stating that “roughly one year after the Polish class actions pro-
cedure came into force, [forty] class action complaints were filed in various courts,” 
mostly against the Polish Government [the State Treasury] not private businesses). 
 107. See Arbitrazh Protsessual’nyi Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii [APK RF] [Code of 
Commercial Procedure of the Russian Federation] art. 225.14 (Russ.) (stating that the 
class member may join the class claim by forwarding a document); see also Ivan Marisin 
& Vasily Keznetsov, Russia, in GLOBAL LEGAL GROUP, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
GUIDE TO: CLASS & GROUP ACTIONS 2011, ch. 21, ¶¶ 1.3–1.4 (2011), available at 
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/3983.pdf. 
 108. See MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 30 (Japan) (instituting a 
limited representative action, known as appointed party system, in which persons having 
a common interest may appoint one member as the representative for the entire body); 
Yasuhei Taniguchi, The 1996 Code of Civil Procedure of Japan—A Procedure for the 
Coming Century?, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 767, 782–83 (1997). 
 109. Compare CHRISTOPHER HODGES, THE REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE 
ACTIONS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 128, 130 (2008) [hereinafter HODGES, REFORM OF 
CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS] (noting the European Commission’s policy deci-
sion that "the opt-in procedure is to be preferred and the opt-out avoided in any Commu-
nity measures that may be put forward. There may be further heated debate on this issue, 
but this political decision is likely to stick and to be influential with Member States”), 
with Mulheron, Opt-Out, supra note 102, at 450–51 (discussing more recent official pub-
lications and noting a shift in the position of the European Commission towards a more 
favorable view of the opt-in device). One can only hope that Hodges’ prediction is incor-
rect and Europe would ultimately adopt a sensible opt-out class action. 
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opt-out system, but failed and currently does not have any type of class 
action legislation yet.112 
The Netherlands is in a class of its own. It is a curious and unique case 
of a country that did not adopt a class action litigation rule, but adopted 
(i.e., copied) the untested and much more recent, controversial, and risky 
“settlement class actions” (or “settlement-only class actions”).113 The 
Dutch statute allows a class settlement that would have binding effect 
against every class member that does not exclude him or herself from the 
class (opt out).114 However, counterintuitively, the statute does not pro-
vide for a class action.115 The Dutch legislature considered that, because 
most class action cases brought in the United States settle anyway, it 
would be more efficient to “cut to the chase” and adopt only the rules in 
U.S. class action legislation that are most commonly used.116 The Dutch 
legislature simply ignored or rejected the common sense idea that with-
out the threat of class action litigation, class action settlement negotia-
tions cannot be conducted at arm’s length between the class and the de-
fendant. The possibility of a class resolution of the controversy is entirely 
in the hands of the good will of the defendant. If the defendant does not 
want to settle on a class-wide basis, the class has no power to bring a 
                                                                                                         
 110. See Lei No. 83/95, art. 15, de 31 de agosto de 1995, D.R., no. 201, de 31.08.1995 
(Port.) (providing class members’ opt-out rights). The Portuguese class action is called 
popular action (acção popular), adopting the traditional Roman Law terminology. It is 
important to note, however, that in Portugal a class judgment will not bind absent mem-
bers if it was decided against the interest of the class due to lack of evidence. See id. art. 
19.1; see supra Part I.B.3. (The Peculiar Res Judicata Model is Followed by Some Latin 
American Countries) (discussing how some Latin American countries follow a res judi-
cata rule that is similar to an old Brazilian system). See generally Mariana Grança Gou-
veira & Nuno Garoupa, Class Actions in Portugal, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
CLASS ACTIONS IN EUROPE 342 (Jürgen G. Backhaus, Alberto Cassone & Giovanni B. 
Ramello eds., 2012). 
 111. See Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade [WCAM] [Dutch Collective Set-
tlement of Mass Damage Act], (Dutch Civil Code, s. 7:908.2), Staatsblad van het Kon-
inkrijk der Nederlanden [Stb.] 2005, p. 380 (Neth.). 
 112. In Belgium, there is a government proposal to introduce an opt-out class action, 
based on the Quebec system. See Piet Taelman & Stefaan Voet, Belgium and Collective 
Redress: The Last of the European Mohicans, in THE BELGIAN REPORTS AT THE 
CONGRESS OF WASHINGTON OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
305, 337–44 (Eric Dirix & Yves-Henri Leleu eds., 2011); see also STEFAAN VOET, EEN 
BELGISCHE VERTEGENWOORDIGENDE COLLECTIEVE RECHTSVORDERING (2012) (Dutch). 
 113. See WCAM (Dutch Civil Code, s. 7:908.2), Stb. 2005, p. 380 (Neth.). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. This is the equivalent of a country adopting rules for same-sex divorce without 
previously having adopted any legislation on same-sex marriage. After all, most mar-
riages end up in divorce anyway. 
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class action and take the matter to judicial resolution.117 This deplorable 
rule has been the object of much hype in Europe and elsewhere, at a level 
of attention and adulation that is beyond comprehension. Part of it is be-
cause of its use in a “successful” international agreement.118 But another 
part is marketing for those interested in making Amsterdam a hub for 
international class actions, as well as multinational companies who feel 
extremely comfortable in such defendant-friendly environment. The 
natural drawbacks of the “settlement class actions,” which is worrisome 
enough in the United States, are greatly magnified in the Netherlands, a 
country that resultantly will never have any practical experience with 
trying a class action.119 
Norway120 and Denmark121 have adopted a middle ground between 
these two models. Their default rule is opt in, but the opt-out device can 
be used in some circumstances, such as in cases of small claims. In 
Denmark, only the Consumer Ombudsman can initiate an opt-out class 
action.122 This hybrid opt-in/opt-out device was reflected in other class 
action proposals in Europe.123 This middle ground proposal is certainly 
                                                                                                         
 117. See generally Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997). 
[In a system in which class settlement is allowed,] despite the impossibility of 
litigation, both class counsel and court would be disarmed. Class counsel con-
fined to settlement negotiations [would not be able to] use the threat of litiga-
tion to press for a better offer, and the court would face a bargain proffered for 
its approval without benefit of adversarial investigation. 
Id. 
 118. See Nagareda, supra note 2, at 37–41 (discussing, from a critical perspective, the 
circumstances of the settlement in the United States and The Netherlands of the Royal 
Dutch Shell case). 
 119. See infra notes 214–23 and accompanying text (discussing the Con-
verium/Morrison settlement in the United States and The Netherlands). 
 120. See Lov om mekling og rettergang i sivile tvister [Act Relating to Mediation and 
Procedure in Civil Disputes] av 17 juni 2005 JUSTIS- OG BEREDSKAPSDEPARTEMENTET 
[JD] 2005:8 §§ 35-6, 35-7, 35-8 (2005) (Nor.), translated at 
http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-20050617-090-eng.pdf. 
 121. See RETSPLEJELOVEN [Administration of Justice Act] § 254(e)(6), (8) (2008) 
(Den.). 
 122. See id. 
 123. See, e.g., GUILLAUME CERUTTI & MARC GUILLAUME ET AL., RAPPORT SUR 
L’ACTION DE GROUPE 29–31 (Dec. 2005) (Fr.), available at 
http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/054004458/0000.pdf; Commission 
Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, at 10, 12–13, COM (2008) 794 final 
(Nov. 27, 2008). 
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influenced by similar experimentation elsewhere a couple of decades 
ago, such as in the United States,124 England,125 and South Africa.126 
Although class actions have existed in Spain for more than a decade, 
the situation there is still uncertain. The language of Spanish class action 
law is ambiguous127 and legal commentators have contradictory and un-
certain opinions on how to interpret these vagueries.128 
                                                                                                         
 124. See Edward Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 13, 33–34, 70–71 (1996) (proposing to add a new Rule 23(c)(1)(A) giving discre-
tionary power to the court to determine whether a class action should proceed in an “opt-
out” or “opt-in” basis); see also Edward Cooper, Class-Action Advice in the Form of 
Questions, 11 DUKE J. COMP. INT’L L. 215 (2001). This flexible approach is adopted in 
Pennsylvania state class actions. See PA. R. CIV. P. 1711 (1999). 
 125. See LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE FINAL REPORT ¶ 46 (2000), available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/sec4c.htm 
(arguing that “[t]he court should have the power to [maintain a class action] on an ‘opt-
out’ or ‘opt-in’ basis, whichever contributes best to the effective and efficient disposition 
of the case”). 
 126. SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMM’N, THE RECOGNITION OF A CLASS ACTION IN SOUTH 
AFRICAN LAW 38 (Working Paper 57, Project 88, Nov. 1995) (S. Afr.). The proposed 
Public Interest Actions and Class Actions Act in South Africa, gives the court discretion-
ary powers to adopt an opt-in notice (in limited circumstances), an opt-out notice, or no 
notice at all. Id.; Wouter Le R de Vos, Reflections on the Introduction of a Class Action 
in South Africa, 1996 J.S. AFR. L. 639, 646–48. 
 127. See LEY DE ENJUCIAMIENTO CIVIL [L.E. CIV.] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] art. 
222.3 (2000) (Spain) (providing that the class action judgment is binding on nonparties) 
and id. art. 519 (allowing, in some circumstances, that class members benefit from a class 
judgment during the phase of its enforcement). Spain, therefore, does not provide specifi-
cally neither for an opt-in nor for an opt-out provision. Id. 
  The Spanish group litigation regime has a special development on Consumer 
Law. The last version of Consumer Protection Act (Consolidated Text of the General 
Consumer and User Protection Act and other supplementary laws: Texto Refundido de la 
Ley General de Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios) has been passed by Legislative 
Royal Decree 1/2007 of 16 November 2007. B.O.E. 2007, 49181 (Spain). Provisions 
related to consumer actions are in articles 53 to 58. See Pablo Gutiérrez de Cabiedes, 
Comentario a los artículos 53 a 58, COMENTARIOS A LAS NORMAS DE PROTECCION DE LOS 
CONSUMIDORES 414–74 (2011) (Spain). 
 128. Compare PABLO GUTIERREZ DE CABIEDES HIDALGO, GROUP LITIGATION IN SPAIN: 
NATIONAL REPORT (2007), available at 
http://law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/spain_national_report.pdf, 
with JUAN MONTERO AROCA ET AL., DERECHO JURISDICCIONAL: PROCESO CIVIL 488 (Ti-
rant lo Blanch ed., 18th ed. 2010) (Spain) (discussing the Spanish class action in Spain as 
mandatory, i.e., without possibility of opting out, and the res judicata producing effects 
whether the judgment was favorable or not); ANDRÉS DE LA OLIVA SANTOS & IGNACIO 
DÍEZ-PICAZO GIMÉNEZ, DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL: EL PROCESO DE DECLARACIÓN 501 
(2000) (same) (Spain); MANUEL ORTELLS RAMOS, DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL 150, 567 
(6th ed. 2005) (Spain) (same); Lorena Bachmaier Winter, La Tutela de los Derechos e 
Intereses Colectivos de Consumidores y Usarios en el Proceso Civil Español, in LAS 
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Germany does not have class actions for damages, but has recently im-
plemented a “test case” or “model case” device.129 It is not really an “opt-
in” device because the decision on the “model case” will bind all share-
holders that filed a claim in court.130 
Rachel Mulheron has said that “[e]ssentially, it is a question of policy 
as to whether a person’s legal rights should be determined without [their] 
express consent and [a] mandate to participate in the litigation.”131 There 
is no doubt that the matter is highly controversial.132 However, this is not 
                                                                                                         
ACCIONES PARA LA TUTELA, supra note 95, at 1, 47–48, with Lorenzo M. Bujosa Vadell, 
El acceso a la justicia de los consumidores y usuarios, in DERECHOS DE LOS 
CONSUMIDORES Y USUARIOS 1780–86 (Alicia de León Arce & Luz María García García 
coords., 2d ed. 2007) (Spain) (admitting that the literal interpretation of the law provides 
for a mandatory class action without a right to opt out, but considering that it would be 
unconstitutional to bind class members, at least against their interest, without giving them 
opt-out rights, and proposing that the class judgment must bind the class members only if 
favorable), with José Luis Vázquez Sotelo, La Tutela de los Intereses Colectivos y Difu-
sos en la Nueva Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil Española, in LAS ACCIONES PARA LA 
TUTELA, supra note 95, at 177, 188–89 (considering unconstitutional a class action judg-
ment that is binding on absent members whether-favorable-or-not). See also JAVIER 
LÓPEZ SÁNCHEZ, EL SISTEMA DE LAS CLASS ACTIONS EN LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA 
(2011) (Spain) (providing a Spanish perspective on the American class actions); Pablo 
Gutierrez de Cabiedes Hidalgo, La nueva Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil y los daños con 
múltiples afectados, 37 ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO JUDICIAL 133, 192–98 (2001) (Spain). 
 129. See Gesetz über Musterverfahren in kapitalmarktrechtlichen Streitigkeiten [Kap-
MuG] [Capital Markets Model Case Act], Aug. 15, 2005, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I 
[BGBL. I] at 2437, § 2, ¶ 1 (Ger.). 
 130. See generally Eberhard Feess & Axel Halfmeier, The German Capital Markets 
Model Case Law (KapMuG)—A European Role Model for Increasing the Efficiency of 
Capital Markets? Analysis and Suggestions for Reform 10 (Working Paper, Jan. 30, 
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1684528&. Stat-
ing that the German model case is neither an opt in nor an opt out, 
since the claimant has no choice whether to participate or not in the model case 
proceedings. An investor can either not sue at all, thereby foregoing his poten-
tial claim due to the relatively short limitation period, or she brings an action 
which will then automatically be included in the model case proceedings. This 
no-option rule was chosen to avoid parallel proceedings by collecting cases in 
one court. 
Id.; see also Baumgartner, supra note 10, at 342–44 (discussing “pilot suits” or “model 
suits” that has existed since the 1980s in Switzerland, but which, in contrast from the 
German counterpart, do not have a binding effect on third parties). 
 131. See RACHAEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS: 
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 29 (2004) [hereinafter MULHERON, CLASS ACTION IN 
COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS]. 
 132. See generally 2 ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT ON CLASS ACTIONS 467 
(1982) (Can.) [hereinafter ONT. LAW REFORM COMM’N]. The report, written three decades 
ago, notes that 
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a matter of policy choice, but an example of the influence of raw political 
power. No good faith governmental policy can justify an opt-in ap-
proach, especially in the case of small claims class actions (negative 
value class claims).133 The only reason why countries adopt opt-in class 
action is because of the lobby of major corporations and the interest of 
the government itself. 
Most major Western common law countries, such as the United 
States,134 Canada,135 and Australia,136 have adopted opt-out class actions. 
                                                                                                         
[o]ne of the most controversial issues in the design of a class action procedure 
is whether class members should be bound automatically by the judgment, un-
less they exclude themselves from the action after certification, or whether 
class members . . . should be required to take affirmative action after certifica-
tion in order to be bound by the judgment. 
Id.; Mulheron, Opt-Out, supra note 102, at 412. (“[T]here is, in this author’s view, one 
question which hovers above all others: should European Member States implement an 
opt-out form of collective redress?”). 
 133. The disadvantage of the opt-in approach is clear and a near unanimity in class 
action scholarship. See, e.g., ONT. LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 132, at 467–92; 
Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 20, at 202–08 (discussing four disadvantages of the opt-
in approach: low incentive for representatives [and class counsel], low participation rate 
for class members, lack of global peace for defendants, and low deterrence); Mulheron, 
Opt-Out, supra note 102, at 413 (“there is an overwhelming evidence of need for an opt-
out collective redress mechanism, in order to supplement presently existing procedural 
devices available to claimants.”). No credible theory that the opt-in approach is a superior 
method of adjudicating collective or mass wrongs has ever been advanced. See MARTIN 
H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE 
CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 36–42, 13–33, 169–73 (2009) (advancing the proposition that “a 
process that requires absent claimants to affirmatively opt into a class proceeding is pref-
erable to an opt-out procedure, purely as a matter of democratic theory”); HODGES, 
REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS, supra note 109, at 118–30, 245–46 
(favoring an opt-in approach). Even Christopher Hodges, however, admits that an opt-in 
approach may “constitute a barrier to genuine claimants joining a case because of issues 
of lack of knowledge of the procedure and costs, and thus a barrier to justice.” Id. at 120. 
He further recognizes that this is particularly relevant in small value claim and “[t]he 
result is that justice is not served if an acceptable majority of those who have rights are 
not vindicated, if damage goes uncompensated or unrectified and if defendants keep il-
licit gains.” Id. 
 134. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c). 
 135. See, e.g., Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. 40, s. 56, art. 1007 (Can.) (providing 
that “[a] member may request his exclusion from the group by notifying the clerk of his 
decision, by registered or certified mail, before the expiry of the time limit for exclusion” 
and that “[a] member who has requested his exclusion is not bound by any judgment on 
the demand of the representative”); Province of Ontario Class Proceedings Act, S.O. 
1992, c. 6, art. 9 (Can.) (providing that “[a]ny member of a class involved in a class pro-
ceeding may opt out of the proceeding in the manner and within the time specified in the 
certification order”); British Columbia Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50, art. 
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England, however, despite originating class actions,137 remains the only 
major Western common law country without any class action system at 
all. The British system consists of only a modest device that could be 
described as a voluntary (i.e., opt-in) aggregation of similar individual 
lawsuits.138 
                                                                                                         
16(1) (Can.) (providing that “[a] member of a class involved in a class proceeding may 
opt out of the proceeding in the manner and within the time specified in the certification 
order”). Curiously, the British Columbia Act provides an opt-in procedure for non-
residents of that province. See id. § 16(2) (“[A] person who is not a resident of British 
Columbia may . . . opt in to [the] class proceeding.”). See generally WARD K. BRANCH, 
CLASS ACTIONS IN CANADA, ch. 10 (2006) (discussing the opt out device in Canadian 
class actions); ELAINE ADAIR ET AL., DEFENDING CLASS ACTIONS IN CANADA 328 (Kath-
leen Jones-Lepidas ed., 2d ed. 2007) (Can.) (same); Walker, A View from Across the 
Border, supra note 9, at 767–71 (“The combined effect of the residency requirement for 
the local operation of the opt-out class action regime and the opt-in requirement for non-
residents is intended to prevent uncertainty from arising in respect of the binding effect of 
the certification of a multi-jurisdiction class.”); see also ALBERTA LAW REFORM INST., 
CLASS ACTIONS: FINAL REPORT NO. 95, ch. 4 (2000) (“an ‘opt out’ system is the normal 
choice in Canada”). 
 136. See Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 33(j)(2) (Austl.) (providing that 
“A group member may opt out of the representative proceeding by written notice given 
under the Rules of Court before the date so fixed”); see also MULHERON, CLASS ACTION 
IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 131, at 29–38 (discussing the opt-out mod-
els of the various common law countries). 
 137. See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE 
MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987). 
 138. See Civil Procedure Rules [CPR], 1998, S.I. 1998/3132, r. 19.10 (U.K.) (regulat-
ing the Group Litigation Order, by which a person who already brought an individual 
lawsuit may request that his or her individual case be consolidated with other similar 
cases and may also request to be removed later). See generally NEIL ANDREWS, ENGLISH 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 971–1011 (2003); ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, ZUCKERMAN ON CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICE 517–18 (2003); CHRISTOPHER HODGES, MULTI-
PARTY ACTIONS 29–46 (2001).  
  Although England does not have a class action device, some English commenta-
tors that directly faced the issue have tentatively opined that a U.S. class action judgment 
would be recognized and enforced in England, while others have offered a different opin-
ion. See Dixon, supra note 4, at 134. 
The law in this area is difficult to analyse as there is no case that has really 
come close to considering this issue. Rather, there are a number of cases that 
deal with aspects of the issue. After assessing the principles inherent in those 
cases, I have come to the conclusion that the US judgment approving the set-
tlement of the class action has a good chance of being upheld in England. 
Id. 
[I]t is impossible to be certain on the existing state of English law whether a 
judgment in a US class action would be recognised and enforced in England in 
respect of absent claimants who did not opt out of the class action. However, a 
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Some scholars perceive substantial differences between these types of 
class actions by reference to contingent procedural variations. For exam-
ple, some scholars consider that “collective actions” are opt-in proce-
dures and “class actions” are opt-out procedures.139 Other scholars con-
sider that “collective actions” are those brought by associations and pub-
lic agencies, whereas “class actions” are brought by class members. 
These distinctions and the differences in names are immaterial, however, 
because the various methods represent the same procedural device with 
slightly different formalities.140 However, the fact that European scholars 
try to unsuccessfully distance themselves from the so called “American-
style” class actions demonstrates their hostile attitude toward the class 
action device.141 The mere existence of the derisive qualification 
“American-style” class action is troubling.142 
                                                                                                         
good case for such a judgment’s recognition and enforcement in England can 
be made. 
Harris, supra note 5, at 650. That was enough to convince one U.S. court. See In re 
Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 242 F.R.D 76, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
While the issue is hardly free from doubt, based on the affidavits before it, the 
Court concludes that English courts, when ultimately presented with the issue, 
are more likely than not to find that U.S. courts are competent to adjudicate 
with finality the claims of absent class members and, therefore, would recog-
nize a judgment or settlement in this action. 
Id. But see ADRIAN BRIGGS & PETER REES, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS 572–73 
(4th ed. 2005) (Eng.) (stating that an American class action judgment would have no 
preclusive effect in England); Mulheron, Opt-Out, supra note 102, at 446 n.221 (same). 
 139. See Douglas W. Hawes, In Search of a Middle Ground Between the Perceived 
Excesses of US-Style Class Actions and the Generally Ineffective Collective Action Pro-
cedures in Europe, in PERSPECTIVES IN COMPANY LAW AND FINANCIAL REGULATION: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EDDY WYMEERSCH 200, 200–22 (Michel Tison et al. eds., 2009); 
GAËTANE SCHAEKEN WILLEMAERS, THE EU ISSUER—DISCLOSURE REGIME: OBJECTIVES 
AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 151 (2011). 
 140. See Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil, supra note 36, at 334–39 (discussing the con-
cept of “class actions”); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the 
tradition in civil law scholarship to mistakenly consider the expression “class action” to 
refer only to class action for damages, not injunctive class action). 
 141. See Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil, supra note 36, at 335–37 (preferring the adop-
tion of the terminology “collective action” in Romance languages, but adopting the ter-
minology “class action” in English, and treating them as synonyms). 
 142. See generally Christopher Hodges, Multi-Party Actions: A European Approach, 
11 DUKE J. COMP. INT’L L. 321, 346 (2001) (“Europe neither needs nor wishes to import 
U.S.-style class action litigation.”); see also Nagareda, supra note 2 (discussing European 
aversion to U.S.-style class actions). 
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One of the reasons traditionally given in civil law countries against the 
adoption of an opt-out class action is the fear that binding absent class 
members—especially to an unfavorable decision—in a proceeding to 
which they were not a party due to service of process or voluntary inter-
vention would violate the due process of law.143 This faulty legal argu-
ment simply masks the fact that the legislature is opposed to the enact-
ment of a powerful class action device. Many lawmakers are also afraid 
of scaring business away from their countries, when in a globalized mar-
ket, companies often flee to a more business-friendly environment. 
In such countries, there is a strong predisposition to reject recognition 
of U.S. opt-out class actions, considering it a violation of the due process 
of law.144 At the same time, it is highly likely that most countries would 
                                                                                                         
And, yet, one need spend only a few minutes in conversations with European 
reformers before the proverbial “but” enters the discourse: “But, of course, we 
shall not have American-style class actions.” At this point, all participants nod 
sagely, confident that collective actions, representative actions, group actions, 
and a host of other aggregative arrangements can bring all the benefits of fair 
and efficient resolution to disputes without the dreaded world of American en-
trepreneurial lawyering. 
Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 20, at 180. Not all scholars, of course, use the expression 
“U.S.-style class action” derisively, but it would be convenient to retire its use. There is 
no such a thing as a U.S.-style class action. The concept of class action is universal: it is 
simply an action in which a person (a class member, an association or a governmental 
agency) represents the interests of a group of people in court (for an injunction or dam-
ages). What authors want to designate is a class action that is embedded in the American 
litigation context (of discovery, contingency fees, entrepreneurial lawyers, punitive dam-
ages, high jury awards, high attorney’s fees, etc.). See Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil, su-
pra note 36, at 320–23, 334–35. 
 143. See HODGES, REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS, supra note 109, 
at 119–30 (discussing also the risk of abuse). The irony was not missed by a commenta-
tor; Nagareda, supra note 2, at 30–31. 
On this point, the contrast between the United States and Europe makes for an 
ironic juxtaposition. The nation known in stylized fashion for a kind of “cow-
boy” individualism actually accords less normative significance to the individ-
ual civil claim, in a sense, than do nations in which ideals of socialism and col-
lectivization continue to enjoy greater purchase. 
Id. 
 144. See Pinna, supra note 5, at 39–41. Pinna states that, after analyzing several affi-
davits or expert opinions on the matter, 
These reasons [of potential refusal of recognition] seem to be based on the idea 
that the features of a class action procedure offend the very foundations of do-
mestic law of the European legal systems . . . . [I]t is clear that everywhere in 
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recognize a foreign opt-in class action judgment, even if the country in 
question does not have any type of class action in its legal system.145 
Moreover, as will be more fully developed below, in countries where 
the legal system only accepts opt-in class actions (or no class actions at 
all), class members will not be able understand a notice based upon the 
concept of an opt-out procedure. The idea that one must “exclude” one-
self from a class action in order to not be bound by it is simply alien to 
the people in these countries. The level of notice provided in these situa-
tions is simply inadequate to satisfy due process.146 
D. Countries That Have a Class Action System That is Substantially 
Similar to the United States 
The only country in Latin America that has a class action system that is 
substantially similar, in the relevant part, to the U.S. model is Colombia. 
                                                                                                         
Europe the main problem with US class actions is the opt-out mechanism and 
its asserted contrariety to the domestic foundations of civil procedure. 
Id. Paradigmatic of this attitude is the brief filed by the French government in the Su-
preme Court case Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.: “the opt-out aspect of U.S. 
class actions runs afoul of fundamental French public policy and due process principles.” 
See Brief for Republic of France as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Morrison v. 
Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191); see also Mulheron, Opt-
Out, supra note 102, at 412 (“for most European Member States, the concept [of an opt-
out class action] is an anathema.”); Sturner, supra note 3, at 110 (opt-out class actions are 
a violation of the right to be heard provided for in the German Constitution). But see 
Matousekova, supra note 5, at 676 (“Arguably, as criticisable as they may be, foreign 
class actions do not constitute such intolerable offence to the French forum.”). 
 145. See, e.g., Pinna, supra note 5, at 39–40 (stating that “[I]t is almost certain that 
European legal systems will give Res Judicata effect to ‘opt-in’ class-actions judgments, 
but this is not self-evident regarding opt-out class actions,” but concluding that “Euro-
pean legal systems are presently less allergic to class-action-like procedures than they 
used to be” and predicting that the courts of Europe will recognize U.S. opt-out class 
actions); IBA LEGAL PRACTICE, GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 5, 22 (stating that judgments 
against class members who opted into a class action would be recognized by reference to 
traditional rules of recognition and stating that “a person who opts in has accepted the 
jurisdiction of the court and any judgment in the action should be binding on him or her 
subject to generally recognised exceptions”); Murtagh, supra note 6, at 27–28 (stating 
that an opt-in class action would “enhance the likelihood of foreign courts recognizing 
class action judgments because the class action would only purport to bind plaintiffs who 
had affirmatively opted into the class, as opposed to absent parties who did not partici-
pate in the case in any way,” but cautioned that recent case law may have precluded the 
possibility of the certification of an opt-in class action). 
 146. See supra Part II.A. (Class Action Notice in Latin America Would Be Inade-
quate). 
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Colombia has a reasonably long tradition of sophisticated legislation147 
and scholarship148 on the subject of class actions for damages. The cur-
rent class action statute, enacted in 1998, is carefully worded and ex-
tremely detailed, and includes eighty-six rules, totaling several dozen 
pages.149 Contrary to the reality and trend in Latin America, Colombia’s 
class action device, especially its class action for damages, is in many 
significant ways very similar to the U.S. model. 
It is true that, in certain respects, Colombia’s class action model differs 
from the U.S. model. However, these are mere procedural differences 
that are not relevant for the purposes of this Article. The important point 
is that Colombia has adopted an opt-out class action mechanism and the 
class judgment binds absent class members whether it is favorable to the 
interests of the class or not.150 In addition, the Colombian class action 
model specifically allows for court-approved settlements.151 
Because Colombia has a class action model that is similar to the United 
States’ in relevant part, the specificities of the Colombian class action do 
not represent an obstacle to the recognition of a U.S. class action judg-
ment or court-approved settlement.152 Rather, the obstacles to such rec-
                                                                                                         
 147. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 88; L. 472, agosto 6, 1998, 
D.O. 43.357, arts. 56, 61 (Colom.). 
 148. See, e.g., MARTÍN BERMÚDEZ MUÑOZ, LA ACCIÓN DE GRUPO: NORMATIVA Y 
APLICACIÓN EN COLOMBIA (Universidad del Rosario ed., 1st ed. 2007) (Colom.); RAMIRO 
BEJARANO GUZMÁN, PROCESOS DECLARATIVOS: CIVILES, AGRARIOS, DE FAMILIA, 
ARBITRAMENTO: ACCIONES POPULARES Y DE GRUPO: LEY DE CONCILIACIÓN (3rd ed. 2005) 
(Colom.); PEDRO PAULO CAMARGO, LAS ACCIONES POPULARES Y DE GRUPO: GUÍA 
PRACTICA DE LA LEY 472 DE 1998 (4th ed. 2004) (Colom.); JAVIER TAMAYO JARAMILLO, 
LAS ACCIONES POPULARES Y DE GRUPO EN LA RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL (2001) (Colom.); 
PABLO A. MORENO CRUZ, EL INTERÉS DE GRUPO COMO INTERÉS JURÍDICO TUTELADO 
(2002) (Colom.); LUIS FELIPE BOTERO ARISTIZÁBAL, ACCIÓN POPULAR Y NULIDAD DE 
ACTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS: PROTECCIÓN DE DERECHOS COLECTIVOS (1st ed. 2004) 
(Colom.); Jairo Parra Quijano, Acciones populares y acciones para tutela de los intereses 
coletivos, 2 REVISTA IBEROAMERICANA DE DERECHO PROCESAL 120 (2002) (Colom.); 
Jairo Parra Quijano, Algunas Reflexiones Sobre la Ley 472 de 1998 Conocida en 
Colombia con el Nombre de Acciones Populares y Acciones de Grupo, in LAS ACCIONES 
PARA LA TUTELA, supra note 95, at 111; see also Gómez, supra note 40 (manuscript at 
30–42). 
 149. See L. 472, agosto 6, 1998, D.O. 43.357 (Colom.). 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id. arts. 56, 61; supra Part I.B.2. (Class Representatives Have No Authority to 
Settle and Compromise the Rights of Absent Class Members) (discussing the impossibil-
ity of settlement and disposition of group rights in class actions in some Latin American 
countries). 
 152.  
On the one hand, if the foreign country has a class-action-like remedy, courts in 
that country may be more likely to recognize a class-action judgment that in-
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ognition are to be found elsewhere. These obstacles include the tradi-
tional prerequisites for recognition of any judgment, i.e., inadequacy of 
class notice,153 lack of jurisdiction over absent class members,154 and the 
need for rogatory letters to communicate with absent class members.155 
E. Countries with Unique Considerations 
Three Latin American countries—Argentina, Panama, and Ecuador—
do not fit neatly into any of the four categories discussed above. Argen-
tina is a country in a state of transition with respect to class actions, and 
Panama and Ecuador have an ambiguous class action regulation. 
Argentina is in a class of its own, being perhaps the most unpredictable 
country in Latin America regarding class actions for damages. Article 43 
of the Argentinean Constitution sets the overall favorable tone for the 
                                                                                                         
cludes opt-out class members. But at the same time, the availability of an alter-
native remedy may mean that there is a more appropriate alternative in that 
country and plaintiffs need not be part of a U.S. class action lawsuit . . . . The 
availability of an alternative remedy may be a factor . . . on the question of 
class certification in a case where the connections with the case are largely for-
eign. Whether a class-action lawsuit is a superior method of proceeding may 
depend in part on what procedures for settlement or adjudication exist in the 
foreign forum. 
Choi & Silberman, supra note 33, at 479, 485–86; see also Murtagh, supra note 6, at 36–
44 (proposing that the inclusion of foreign class members in U.S. class actions may not 
be a superior method of deciding the controversy, since many countries now, particularly 
in Europe, have adequate remedies to protect group rights). 
It seems likely that courts outside the United States might consider their own 
standards for certifying class actions in determining whether to recognize the 
certification of a class action by another court and to treat absent class members 
as precluded from bringing claims before them. If a court regards the reasons 
for including absent non-resident plaintiffs in a class certified elsewhere to be 
consistent with the objectives of its own class action regime, it may be more 
likely to give preclusive effect to the certification order. 
Walker, A View from Across the Border, supra note 9, at 776; id. at 797 (stating that 
“there do not appear to be obvious systematic bases” for Canadian courts to deny preclu-
sive effect to U.S. class action judgments); Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 60 (“[S]ystems that 
themselves use class actions are likely to enforce claim preclusion [of U.S. class action 
judgments].”). Although it is true that legal systems that adopt an opt-out class action are 
more likely to recognize U.S. class action judgments, there are other obstacles to recogni-
tion. See also Catherine Piché, The Cultural Analysis of Class Action Law, 2 J. CIVIL L. 
STUD. 102 (discussing a case in which a Québec court refused recognition of an Ontario 
class action judgment). 
 153. See infra Part II.A. 
 154. See infra Part II.B. 
 155. See infra Part II.C. 
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country’s openness to class actions.156 Recently, the Supreme Court in 
the Halabi case criticized the absence of class action legislation. The 
Court went so far as to say that Article 43 is self-executing and that 
lower courts may entertain class proceedings even in the absence of writ-
ten procedural norms, quite a departure from the civil law tradition.157 
Moreover, Argentinean scholarship on the subject is vast and sophisti-
cated.158 
The fact remains, however, that Argentina still does not have legisla-
tion on class actions for damages. Currently, several committees are pro-
posing different class action legislation, but no main project has formally 
emerged thus far. Although it is fair to predict that Argentina will likely 
enact class action legislation in the next few years, it is impossible to 
foresee its content. 
However, despite the good will expressed by the Supreme Court and 
the Constitution, and despite the sophistication of jurists, the current cir-
cumstances in Argentina are not favorable to an effective class action 
system. Most of the existing provincial class action laws are either opt-in 
systems or permit only a limited binding effect for class action judg-
ments. For example, in the Provinces of Catamarca, La Pampa, and 
Chubut, class actions are opt in, and in the Provinces of Rio Negro and 
Corrientes, the class judgment is only binding if it is favorable to the 
class. In the General Law of Environment, in the consumer and environ-
mental laws of the Province of Buenos Aires, and in the Código Procesal 
de la Província de Tierra del Fuego, the class action judgment is not 
                                                                                                         
 156. Art. 43, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.) (providing for lawsuits 
for the protection of group rights in general, including specifically those related to the 
environment, discrimination, consumer, and antitrust.). 
 157. See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of 
Justice], 24/2/2009, “Halabi, Ernesto c. P.E.N. / ley 25.873 –dto. 1563/04 s/amparo law 
16.986,” La Ley [L.L.] (2009) (Arg.). 
 158. See, e.g., LEANDRO J. GIANNINI, LA TUTELA COLECTIVA DE DERECHOS 
INDIVIDUALES HOMOGÉNEOS (2007) (Arg.); JAVIER H. WAJNTRAUB, PROTECCIÓN JURÍDICA 
DEL CONSUMIDOR (2004) (Arg.); ENRIQUE M. FALCÓN, 6 TRATADO DE DERECHO PROCESAL 
CIVIL Y COMERCIAL (2007) (Spain); PROCESOS COLECTIVOS (Eduardo Oteiza, ed., 2006) 
(Arg.); FRANCISCO VERBIC, PROCESOS COLECTIVOS (2007) (Arg.); GUSTAVO MAURINO, 
EZEQUIEL NINO & MARTÍN SIGAL, LAS ACCIONES COLECTIVAS (2005) (Arg.); OSVALDO 
ALFREDO GOZAÍNI, PROTECCIÓN PROCESAL DEL USUARIO Y CONSUMIDOR (2005) (Arg.); 
Roberto Berizonce & Leandro Giannini, La Acción Colectiva Reparadora de los Daños 
Individualmente Sufridos en el Anteproyeto Iberoamericano de Procesos Colectivos, in 
UN DIÁLOGO IBEROAMERICANO, supra note 12, at 63; Patricia Bermejo, Algunas 
Reflexiones Sobre la Aplicación del Anteproyecto de Código Modelo de Procesos 
Colectivos para Ibero-América en la República Argentina, in UN DIÁLOGO 
IBEROAMERICANO, supra note 12, at 490; see also Gómez, supra note 40 (manuscript at 
54–64). 
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binding on the class if the judgment was in favor of the defendant due to 
a lack of evidence.159 This mechanism was also the proposal of a group 
of scholars, judges, and practitioners who met in Mendoza in 2005 to 
discuss the subject of class actions in the XXIII National Civil Procedure 
Conference (Conclusion 9).160 The Argentine scholarship generally is 
divided.161 
If Argentina adopts either an opt-in class action or a class action sys-
tem in which a judgment will be binding only if favorable to the class, it 
is doubtful that Argentina will recognize a foreign class action judgment 
or court-approved class action settlement.162 
Panama is in a completely different situation. It has an extremely un-
developed class action system with no class action tradition whatsoever. 
The class action regulation is found solely in Article 129 of Law 45 of 
2007, a statute that governs consumer protection. 
Class actions in Panama, as is the case in many other Latin American 
and European countries, are limited solely to actions for damages or in-
jury resulting from a product or service.163 Therefore, the type of class 
                                                                                                         
 159. See VERBIC, supra note 158, at 261–66. For a broad comparative study of provin-
cial class action law in Argentina, see MAURINO, NINO & SIGAL, supra note 158, at 359–
76. See also Law No. 5034, Cat., Aug. 14, 2001, [68] B.O.P. 2001–24, art. 20 (Cata-
marca, Arg.); Law No. 1352, LPa., Nov. 14, 1991, B.O. 13–12–1991 (La Pampa, Arg.); 
Law No. 4572, Cht., June 20, 2006 (Chubut, Arg.); CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL Y 
COMERCIAL DE LA PROVÍNCIA RIO NEGRO [CÓD. PROC. CIV. Y COM. RNG.] art. 225 (Pablo 
Verani & Oscar Alfredo Machado eds., 1998) (Arg.); CÓDIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTOS EN LO 
CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO DE LA PROVINCIA DE CORRIENTES [C.C.A. CTES.] art. 85 
(Arg.); Ley General del Ambiente, Law No. 25675, Nov. 6, 2002, B.O. 28–11–2002, art. 
33 (Buenos Aires, Arg.); Law No. 147, TFg., July 1, 1994, B.O.T. 17–08–94, art. 192 
(Tierra del Fuego, Arg.). 
 160. See FALCÓN, supra note 158, at 1000. 
 161. Compare GIANNINI, LA TUTELA COLECTIVA DE DERECHOS INDIVIDUALES 
HOMOGÉNEOS, supra note 158, at 188–92 (proposing a res judicata whether favorable or 
not as long as there is judicial control of adequacy of representation) and Alejandro C. 
Verdaguer, Litispendencia y cosa juzgada en los procesos colectivos, in PROCESOS 
COLECTIVOS, supra note 158, at 369 (same), with MAURINO, NINO & SIGAL, supra note 
158, at 334 (proposing to adopt both the opt-in and the binding effect only if the judg-
ment is favorable). 
 162. See supra Part I.B. (Countries in Which a Class Action Judgment is Binding Only 
if Favorable to the Class) (discussing the reasons why these countries would not recog-
nize a U.S. class action judgment); supra Part I.C. (Countries that Adopt an Opt-In Class 
Action) (same). 
 163. See Ley 45, de 31 de Octobre de 2007 (Pan.). This is an inexplicably common 
development in civil law countries. Instead of enacting a transsubstantive rule on class 
action litigation, some countries limit the class action applicability to specific areas of 
substantive law, like securities, antitrust, consumer, etc. See, e.g., Taruffo, Remarks on 
Group Litigation, supra note 20, at 406 (stating that most European countries do not ap-
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action available in Panama is significantly different and more limited 
than that available in the United States. 
The main difficulty is that while Panama adopts an opt-out class action 
device, it is not clear whether the binding effect is “whether favorable or 
not” or secundum eventum litis. The statute simply states that the judg-
ment binds all class members.164 The Author is aware of less than a 
dozen class action cases in Panama, and all were denied certification or 
dismissed for procedural reasons, except for one settlement. Therefore, 
there is no case law on the matter. The Author is not aware of any books 
or law review articles on the subject.165 
A literal interpretation of the statute seems to provide for binding ef-
fect “whether favorable or not,” but a constitutional interpretation, on 
due process of law grounds, could lead to an effect secundum eventum 
litis, especially because of the statute’s lack of adequate protection of 
class members’ rights through adequate notice, judicial control of ade-
quate representation, etc. 
Ecuador is yet in a different situation. Despite being a country with no 
tradition of scholarship on class actions,166 Ecuador does have a class 
                                                                                                         
proach class action litigation in general terms and take into consideration only particular 
instances of collective interests, such as those involved in consumer and environmental 
protection). 
while the American class action can be used to litigate, in principle, all subject-
matters, the continental European representative group actions are mostly regu-
lated by laws covering specific legal fields, most commonly consumer litiga-
tion and environmental issues. From a practical point of view, the piecemeal 
legislation that characterizes group litigation in most European countries is the 
product of two opposing forces: the general tendency to restrict group litigation 
as much as possible and the political pressure coming from certain social 
groups such as consumer associations and environmentalists. While the state is 
not willing to grant a general solution, it is forced to concede partial ones. 
Valguarnera, supra note 20, at 37–38. This course of conduct is not only indefensible, it 
is also unsustainable in the long run. With time, either the legislature will extend class 
actions to all areas of substantive law or courageous courts will simply apply these stat-
utes in other situations by analogy. 
 164. See Ley 45, de 31 de Octobre de 2007 (Pan.). 
 165. But see MARCO A. FERNÁNDEZ, CONDICIONES GENERALES DE COMPETENCIA EN 
PANAMA 16–17, U.N. Doc. LC/L.2394-P, U.N. Sales No. S.05.II.G.137 (2005) (a publi-
cation about antitrust law in Panama, with a two-page description of the Panamenian 
class action). 
 166. Probably there has never been any legal article published about class action be-
fore the enactment of the Environmental Management Law of 1999 and possibly none 
has been published for several years after its enactment. 
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action system.167 In 1999, Ecuador enacted its Environmental Manage-
ment Law (the “EML”), which is mostly dedicated to substantive law, 
but contains several procedural rules.168 The EML was first used in the 
litigation between indigenous people from the Amazon Forest and the 
large oil companies of Texaco and Chevron. This action, after a decade-
long litigation process that still seems to show no end, resulted in an 
eighteen billion dollar verdict in 2011, the largest verdict in history.169 
The EML does not speak to key elements of a functioning class action 
system, demanding great judicial creativity to apply it in practice.170 Al-
though it is clear that the EML allows class actions to recover damages 
for the restoration of the environment as a whole, it is not clear whether 
it also allows class actions for individual damages. If the statute will be 
interpreted to allow class actions for individual damages, it is not clear 
about the binding effect of the judgment or the possibility of settlement. 
There is also no indication as to whether the EML adopts an opt-in or an 
opt-out system. 
II. OBSTACLES TO RECOGNITION OF A U.S. CLASS ACTION JUDGMENT 
DERIVED FROM TRADITIONAL RULES 
In addition to the obstacles discussed above, which are derived from 
the specific class action rules of each country, there are at least three 
other major obstacles to the recognition of U.S. class action judgments 
that are applicable to all Latin American countries. It is important to 
stress that there are other obstacles to recognition of a U.S. class action 
judgment and that the existence of only one obstacle is sufficient to frus-
trate recognition. 
The first obstacle is that the U.S. class action notice delivered outside 
of the United States will invariably be deemed inadequate both according 
to U.S. class action law and the domestic laws of the specific Latin 
American country. The second obstacle is that the U.S. court in many 
cases will not be able to obtain personal jurisdiction over Latin American 
                                                                                                         
 167. Ley No. 37 de Gestión Ambiental [Law of Environmental Management], de 30 de 
julio de 1999, R.O. 245, arts. 28, 29, 41, 42, 43 (Ecuador), available at 
http://www.ambiente.gob.ec/sites/default/files/archivos/leyes/gesion-ambiental.pdf. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See JAMES E. BERGER & CHARLENE C. SUN, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: CHEVRON-
ECUADOR DISPUTE 1–2 (Mar. 2011), available at 
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1870.pdf; Lou Dematteis & Suzana 
Sawyer, Boiling Oil: ChevronTexaco Faces Ecuador’s Courts, IN THESE TIMES (Dec. 
2003), http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/South_America/Boiling_Oil.html. 
 170. See Law of Environmental Management, de 30 de julio de 1999, R.O. 245 (Ecua-
dor). 
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absent class members. The third, and more technical, obstacle is that 
formal service of process through rogatory letters is essential to perfect 
personal jurisdiction over foreign absent class members in Latin Amer-
ica. 
These factors are examined in more detail below.171 
A. Class Action Notice Would Be Inadequate 
Although Brazil has had a sophisticated class action system for almost 
twenty years, its proceedings completely ignore absent class members. A 
Brazilian class action proceeding is conducted solely by the class repre-
sentatives, usually by the office of the state or federal attorney general or 
by an association. Brazilian class action statutes offer no meaningful no-
tice to absent class members.172 The notice requirement is satisfied 
merely by a single bureaucratic publication in an official newspaper.173 
Brazil is a geographically vast and undeveloped country. Therefore, it 
would be impossible to create an adequate and effective notice device in 
such circumstances.174 
Further, Brazil does not have an opt-out form of class action. The ab-
sence of a right to opt out is explained by the fact that class members do 
not need to opt out of the class in Brazil because their individual rights 
would never be bound by a class judgment or settlement. The opt-out 
device is only justified in a system in which the class judgment is bind-
ing on absent class members, regardless of whether the case’s ultimate 
outcome is favorable or not to the class. Therefore, an opt-out system is 
incompatible with Brazil’s system of res judicata secundum eventum litis. 
Where absent members will not be bound by an unfavorable outcome, 
they need not exclude from the class.175 
                                                                                                         
 171. Although this article is focused on Latin American countries, the obstacles herein 
discussed are equally applicable to any other country. 
 172. See Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil, supra note 36, at 341; see also CARNEIRO, supra 
note 68, at 57–58, 220–22, 228, 236; José Marcelo Menezes Vigliar, Alguns aspectos 
sobre a ineficácia do procedimento especial destinado aos interesses individuais ho-
mogêneos, in A AÇÃO CIVIL PÚBLICA APÓS 20 ANOS 328–29 (Édis Milaré coord., 2005); DE 
ASSIS RODRIGUES, supra note 71, at 41–42, 138–39, 279, 302, 303, 312, 313; VENTURI, 
supra note 38, at 395–99. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Brazil has approximately 170 million inhabitants, The World Fact Book: Brazil, 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/br.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2012), unevenly spread over approximately 
8.5 million square kilometers, id., an area larger than the Contiguous United States (i.e., 
excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico). 
 175. See Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil, supra note 36, at 399; see also supra Part I.B. 
(Countries in Which a Class Action Judgment is Binding Only if Favorable to the Class). 
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Because the notion of having one’s rights bound by a failure to “opt-
out” is a foreign concept in Brazil, and in most Latin American countries 
other than Colombia, it would be fundamentally unfair and a denial of 
due process to bind absent class members who do not opt out of a class 
action conducted under the laws of a foreign country. This is even more 
evident when the absent class members have no contacts with the foreign 
country and thus no reason to expect being haled into a foreign court. 
The same reality of class action notice is true in other Latin American 
countries, including Peru,176 Panama,177 and Colombia.178 In each of 
these countries, notice is given in a bureaucratic manner in the official 
newspaper.179 If it would be fundamentally unfair and a denial of due 
process to bind absent class members in countries that lack a tradition of 
effective class action notice; the effect is even more manifest in those 
countries with no established rules on class action notice at all. The prob-
lem is compounded in the many countries that do not have class actions 
for individual damages,180 and in those countries that adopt an opt-in 
class action procedure.181 
Even if, hypothetically, a country which does not have an opt-out class 
action model would be interested in recognizing a U.S. class action 
judgment, the problem remains as to how to convey adequate notice to 
people (class members) who know nothing about the concept of a class 
action or the notion of opting out of one. How can absent class members 
receive meaningful notice if they do not know and have no way of know-
ing what class actions are?182 Apart from the difficulties of adequate no-
                                                                                                         
 176. See CÓD. PROC. CIV., Law No. 10 de 1 de agosto de 1993, art. 82.5 (Peru) (pro-
viding for class notice in the Official Reporter). 
 177. Ley 45, de 31 de Octubre de 2007, art. 129 (Pan.) (providing for class notice in a 
newspaper of national circulation). 
 178. See L. 472, agosto 6, 1998, D.O. 43.357, art. 53 (Colom.); see also MUÑOZ, supra 
note 148, at 335–37 (stating that in Colombia the class action notice is a fiction). 
 179. Costa Rica does not have a class action notice provision, but if it will have one, it 
will probably be in the Official Reporter. See Proyecto de Codigo General, Expediente 
No. 15979, de 11 de agosto de 2005, art. 125 (Costa Rica) (a bill proposing class action 
notice in the Official Reporter). 
 180. See supra Part I.A. (Countries that Do Not Have Class Actions for Damages). 
 181. See supra Part I.C. (Countries that Adopt an Opt-In Class Action). 
  182. See Bassett, supra note 9, at 65–66. 
As unintelligible as a legal notice may seem to a U.S. citizen, a foreign citizen 
is likely to find it even more so . . . . [t]hus, potential language issues, unfamili-
arity with the U.S. legal system, and the natural human tendency to ignore that 
which we do not understand, all combine to render notice potentially ineffec-
tual for foreign claimants. 
2012] U.S. CLASS ACTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 943 
tice, how can absent class members have a meaningful opportunity to opt 
out if they have no idea what an opt-out class proceeding is?183 How can 
an absent class member in a foreign country have a meaningful opportu-
nity to be heard, to participate in the proceeding, and to control the ade-
quacy of the representative if the class proceeding is being conducted in 
a foreign land, using a foreign language with complex legal jargon?184 
Latin Americans are simply not accustomed to receiving official mes-
sages from the judiciary informing them that they are part of a judicial 
proceeding, let alone to having an obligation to actively exclude them-
selves from it in order not to be bound by the result. Since the whole idea 
is simply alien to Latin Americans, any notice stating that they are part of 
an unknown kind of judicial proceeding in the United States would likely 
be read as ludicrous. 
Finally, there is the issue of the content of the notice itself. How would 
one draft a notice to effectively communicate the idea that the claim of a 
foreigner, with no contact to the United States, is the object of litigation 
in the courts of that country? The notice could not merely be a translation 
of the English version, but would have to be written from scratch, in a 
form accessible to the Latin American lay public and devoid of legal jar-
gon. In addition, the drafter might need to be sensitive to the cultural and 
legal peculiarities of each Latin American country. This is a very chal-
lenging hurdle.185 There is a strong probability that absent class members 
                                                                                                         
Id.; Buschkin, supra note 9, at 1582–83 (discussing the unintelligible character of a U.S. 
class action notice to a foreigner); Bermann, supra note 2, at 96. 
 183. See Bassett, supra note 9, at 74. 
Without careful and clear language, the non-U.S. recipient is unlikely to under-
stand its significance, and therefore is more likely merely to discard it, thus 
frustrating both purposes of the opt-out notice. If the notice is not understood, 
an absent class member will not be able to opt out from the existing class litiga-
tion, thereby remaining in the class, although not necessarily by choice, which 
foils the notion of implied consent to the court’s jurisdiction. 
Id. 
 184. See id. at 67. 
[E]ven for those recipients who are able to decipher the class action notice, 
providing a foreign claimant with notice of the pending class litigation does not 
immediately translate into an opportunity to be heard. Retaining counsel in the 
location where the class litigation is proceeding can be both difficult and ex-
pensive for a U.S. citizen living within the country, but handling such a matter 
from outside the U.S. is exponentially more so. 
Id. 
 185. Debra Lyn Bassett suggests adding a cover letter to the notice. 
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will simply not understand the legal implications of the class action no-
tice and what it requires of them. Therefore, the class action notice will 
likely be deemed inadequate, both under the standards of the specific 
Latin American country and the standards of U.S. law.186 
In light of the inherent inadequacy of class action notice, it would be a 
denial of due process for a U.S. court to require a foreign class member 
residing in Latin America to take affirmative steps to “opt out” of an 
American class proceeding on threat of forfeiture of the foreigner’s right 
to pursue individual actions. This would not only violate the constitu-
tional guarantee of due process of law of the Latin American constitu-
tions,187 but also the U.S. Constitution. 
B. A U.S. Court Cannot Validly Obtain Personal Jurisdiction over For-
eign Absent Plaintiff Class Members188 
In order to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment, Latin American 
nations generally demand that the rendering court have jurisdiction over 
the parties.189 Therefore, no Latin American country would recognize a 
                                                                                                         
To facilitate the recipient’s comprehension, [class action] notice . . . . should 
include a cover letter, in the language of the recipient’s home country, ad-
dressed to the specific individual recipient, explaining the purpose of the notice 
in a straightforward manner without legal jargon. 
Bassett, supra note 9, at 90. However, it seems that it would be better to incorporate the 
contents of the cover letter in the notice itself. As a matter of fact, the whole notice must 
be written in the target language, not mechanically translated from English. 
 186. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(b) (“the court must direct to class members the best 
notice that is practicable under the circumstances”). 
 187. See, e.g., CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, sect. LIV (Braz.) 
(“No person shall be deprived of his or her property without due process of law.”). 
 188. Personal jurisdiction over foreign class members is not the only problem faced in 
an international class action. Other important issues are subject matter jurisdiction, the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law (prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction), forum non 
conveniens, etc. See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) 
(discussing subject matter jurisdiction); In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 497 F. Supp. 2d 526 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing extraterritorial application of U.S. law); Buxbaum, supra 
note 2 (discussing subject matter jurisdiction); Choi & Silberman, supra note 33 (discuss-
ing extraterritorial application of U.S. law); In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 
522 F. Supp. 2d 712, 724 (D.N.J. 2007) (holding that the court did not have subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over claims by non-U.S. class members); Jasilli, supra note 6, at 114. 
 189. See CÓD. PROC. CIV., Law No. 295 de 24 de julio de 1984, art. 2104.2 (Peru), 
(providing that the foreign court must have jurisdiction according to its own private in-
ternational law and to general principles of international jurisdiction.); Ley No. 36.511 de 
Derecho Internacional Privado [Private International Law Statute], de 6 de agosto de 
1998, art. 53.4 (Venez.), available at 
http://www.analitica.com/bitblio/congreso_venezuela/private.asp (providing that the 
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U.S. judgment against a foreigner who lacked significant contacts with 
the United States and was not properly subject to jurisdiction there. 
Typically the focus of personal jurisdiction revolves over a defendant 
because the judgment will generally be enforced against the defendant. 
Moreover, by taking the active step of bringing a lawsuit, the plaintiff 
consents to jurisdiction in the foreign court, thereby rendering moot the 
issue of personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff. Therefore, in traditional 
individual litigation, it is unnecessary to discuss the court’s personal ju-
risdiction over a plaintiff. 
In the class action setting, however, in addition to personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant, the court must also consider personal jurisdiction 
over the absent class members. After all, the absent plaintiffs’ rights are 
being affected in much the same way as the defendant’s.190 And contrary 
to a plaintiff in an individual lawsuit, the issue of personal jurisdiction 
over absent class members was not rendered moot by any affirmative 
step of subjecting voluntarily to the court’s jurisdiction.191 
Therefore, a foreign class action judgment that is issued without per-
sonal jurisdiction over absent class members is void and would not be 
recognized in Latin America. The fact is that there are simply no ac-
cepted standards under which United States courts would have personal 
                                                                                                         
foreign court must have jurisdiction according to Venezuelan law); Regimento Interno de 
Supremo Tribunal Federal [Internal Rules of the Supreme Court] art. 217 (2008) (Braz.) 
(providing that a prerequisite of enforcement of foreign judgments is that the foreign 
court have jurisdiction over the party). This rule is well-settled in the Brazilian legal sys-
tem. See Lei Introdução ao Código Civil, Decreto-Lei No. 4.657, de 4 de Setembro de 
1942, D.O.U. de 09.09.1942, art. 15 (Braz.) (same); see also ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 
[ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Dec. 5, 2005, BGBL.I 3202, as amended, art. 328.1.1 
(Ger.) (German courts would not recognize a foreign judgment if the foreign court did 
not have jurisdiction according to the German law). 
 190. Rolf Sturner compares a class action judgment that is unfavorable to the class to a 
negative declaratory judgment denying liability. See Sturner, supra note 3, at 115. 
 191. See Romy, supra note 1, at 793–94 (stating that under Swiss law the rules of ju-
risdiction over defendants should be applied to absent class members by analogy). But 
see Harris, supra note 5, at 617, 618, 625, 630, 635, 650 (It.) (placing a disproportionate 
importance throughout the article in the fact that the absent person is the plaintiff not the 
defendant: “[w]e shall see that the English rules on recognition and enforcement of for-
eign judgments, as stated in the authorities and leading works, are concerned with the 
position of the defendant and not that of the claimant.”). Id. at 625. (“the requirements of 
jurisdictional competence are all focused on the position of the defendant. There is noth-
ing in English law to suggest that a foreign court’s jurisdictional competence depends 
upon the position of the claimant to the action.”). Id. at 650 (Orthodox principles of Eng-
lish law are concerned with jurisdictional competence over a defendant and not over a 
claimant.). 
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jurisdiction over foreign absent class members domiciled outside the 
United States who have had no contacts with the United States.192 
Assuming the foreign class member received actual adequate notice, 
the issue then becomes whether, by not affirmatively opting out of the 
U.S. class action, a foreign class member consented to the jurisdiction of 
U.S. courts.193 In the Author’s opinion, because foreign absent plaintiff 
class members are not taking the active step of bringing a lawsuit against 
the defendant but rather are being represented in court, absent class 
members cannot be said to have consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. 
court. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts held that a 
state court in the United States may properly assert jurisdiction over out-
of-state absent class members that lack minimum contacts with the 
state.194 However, this solution is not universal. In some, but not all, Ca-
nadian provinces, class members who are not residents of that province 
(known as “extraprovincial class members”), must take the affirmative 
step of opting in to a class action that purports to have nationwide ef-
                                                                                                         
 192. See Sturner, supra note 3, at 115 (“It is unlikely that German group members will 
always have sufficient contacts with U.S. to meet the requirement . . . . to support U.S. 
jurisdiction under German law.”). 
 193. Andrea Pinna has correctly distinguished the issue of jurisdiction over foreign 
absent class members in an opt-out class action from the issue of non-conformity of the 
opt-out mechanism with the public policy of the foreign country. These are two com-
pletely different issues. 
Although this legal issue [jurisdiction over foreign absent class members] is of-
ten confused with the matter of conformity of the opt-out mechanism with pub-
lic policy, it must be distinguished intellectually because the two issues do not 
converge at the same level of scrutiny of the foreign judgment. However, in 
practice, the answer to the question of the validity of consent to US jurisdiction 
by absent class members can depend strongly on the analysis of the actual opt 
out mechanism. Indeed, when it is considered that the right for absent class 
members to opt out from a class action lawsuit grants them sufficient protection 
and is therefore not contrary to international public policy, it is possible to con-
clude that the absence of opting out is also a valid consent of the absent plain-
tiff to the jurisdiction of US courts. 
Pinna, supra note 5, at 58. 
 194. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985) (holding that a 
court may exercise jurisdiction over damage claims of absent class members without 
minimum contacts with the rendering state, as long as the court provides “minimal proce-
dural due process protection,” such as adequate notice, adequate representation, an oppor-
tunity to be heard, and an opportunity to opt out). 
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fect.195 This provincial rule may not be very effective for a nationwide 
class action within a country,196 but it may prove to be an effective option 
in the international context.197 
                                                                                                         
 195. See British Columbia Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50, art. 16(2) 
(Can.) (providing that “a person who is not a resident of British Columbia may . . . . opt 
in to [the] class proceeding”). 
 196. The Saskatchewan Class Actions Act of 2002 and the Alberta Class Proceedings 
Act of 2003 adopted a similar rule based on the British Columbia Class Proceedings Act, 
but they were repealed in 2007 and 2010 respectively. See ALBERTA LAW REFORM INST., 
supra note 135, at 92–100 (proposing an opt-in class action for non-residents). Compare 
Peter W. Hogg & S. Gordon McKee, Are National Class Actions Constitutional?, 26 
NAT’L J. CONST. L. 279 (2010), with Janet Walker, Are National Class Actions Constitu-
tional?—A Reply to Hogg and Mckee, 48 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 95 (2010). 
 197. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 997 n.48 (2d Cir. 1975) (rec-
ognizing that the affidavits presented by party-appointed experts had stated that if that 
class action was certified in opt-in form, it would be “far more likely, although still not 
certain,” that foreign jurisdictions would recognize the class action judgment as binding 
to the class members who decided to opt in. 
Potential language barriers, unfamiliar legal procedures, and potential intimida-
tion in dealing with the courts and lawyers of another country all tend to in-
crease the risks of fear, confusion, and misunderstandings by foreign claimants. 
Requiring foreign claimants to affirmatively opt in, rather than absurdly con-
struing their silence as an agreement to be bound by the class litigation, will en-
sure that their consent is genuine. 
Bassett, supra note 9, at 87–89; id. at 88 (“[T]he opt-in procedure is a superior device 
from a due process perspective.”); id. at 89 (“This provides superior due process protec-
tions, and avoids the loss of individual rights under circumstances where neither mini-
mum contacts nor genuine consent exist.”); Monestier, supra note 6, at 1–2 (arguing, 
after a convincing criticism of the current practice, that it is impossible to determine ex 
ante whether foreign courts would recognize U.S. class action judgments or settlements 
and proposing the adoption of the opt-in device for foreign class members). According to 
Monestier, 
[A]n opt-in regime presents a more principled way of determining foreign 
claimants’ class membership in a U.S. class action because an opt-in class ac-
tion: eliminates the res judicata problem altogether, allows all foreign claimants 
to participate in U.S. litigation if they so choose, provides additional protec-
tions for absent foreign claimants, respects international comity; and suffi-
ciently deters defendant misconduct. 
Id. at 61; see also IBA LEGAL PRACTICE, GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 5, 22 (stating that 
judgments against class members who opted into a class action would be recognized by 
reference to traditional rules of recognition and stating that “a person who opts in has 
accepted the jurisdiction of the court and any judgment in the action should be binding on 
him or her subject to generally recognised exceptions”). But see Walker, A View from 
Across the Border, supra note 9, at 769–71 (stating that an opt-in solution for non-
residents would not solve the problem of fairness to foreign class members); Kern v. 
Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2004) (reversing a first instance court who certified 
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In many ways, the issues discussed in this subchapter relating to per-
sonal jurisdiction directly mirror the issues faced by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Shutts and in the Canadian nationwide opt-in provisions. How-
ever, the personal jurisdiction over foreign absent plaintiff class members 
involve more complex considerations than in a wholly domestic setting. 
First, the rule of jurisdiction over out-of-state class members estab-
lished in Shutts is not necessarily applicable as a rule of jurisdiction over 
foreign class members.198 The issues of jurisdiction over a foreign person 
involve different considerations that are not present in the analysis of 
jurisdiction over an out-of-state, or extraprovincial, class member. There-
fore, it cannot be said that Shutts authorizes jurisdiction over foreign 
class members.199 
Second, the focus of this Article is not whether, according to U.S. law, 
U.S. courts have jurisdiction over foreign absent class members. For the 
purposes of this Article, it is irrelevant where U.S. courts consider the 
limits of their international jurisdiction. The objective of this Article is 
not to determine whether the U.S. court may certify a class action that 
includes foreign class members. Since the focus of this Article is to de-
termine whether a U.S. class action judgment can be enforced abroad, the 
laws of the foreign countries are determinative, not the determination of 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Shutts. The laws of the foreign countries 
                                                                                                         
an opt-in class action for foreign class members. According to the Second Circuit an opt-
in class action is prohibited under Rule 23). See also Buschkin, supra note 9, at 1577 
(cautioning against adopting the opt-in class action as a default rule for foreign claimants, 
but recognizing that a certified opt-in class action is better than a dismissed opt-out class 
action: 
if the judge must choose between denying all foreign claimants access to the 
class or certifying foreign claimants under an opt-in class in order to solve po-
tential jurisdictional concerns, the opt-in class is the more desirable of these op-
tions because the opt-in class gives foreign claimants to opportunity to obtain 
redress. 
Strong, supra note 1, at 96 (stating that opt-in arbitrations would be easier to be recog-
nized in some civil-law countries). 
 198. See generally Bassett, supra note 9, at 61 (“a transnational class raises any num-
ber of specialized due process concerns, as contrasted with a class comprised solely of 
U.S. citizens. However, despite facing a class with foreign claimants, Shutts completely 
ignored the impact of their presence.”); see also id. at 79 (“If the class action includes 
foreign claimants, additional due process protections may be necessary as a means of 
ensuring that the assertion.”). 
 199. But see Pinna, supra note 5, at 58–59 (stating that Shutts is also applied in the 
context of foreign class members and concluding that, “[t]herefore, according to US law, 
a US court has jurisdiction over foreign absent class members since they have an actual 
right to opt out.”). 
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would not accept such broad assertion of personal jurisdiction by U.S. 
courts.200 
As Isabelle Romy observes, an unrestricted refusal to recognize U.S. 
class action judgments could lead to unfair results.201 Taken to its ex-
treme, even U.S. class members dissatisfied with a class action judgment, 
either because the class lost or because the class recovery was insuffi-
cient, could escape U.S. res judicata doctrine by bringing individual suits 
in foreign countries against the class defendant.202 Romy proposes a 
compromise whereby foreign absent class members do not consent to 
U.S. jurisdiction by merely not exercising the right to opt out.203 Because 
foreign class members are not parties to the class proceedings, Romy 
submits that they are not bound by the U.S. class judgment and may 
bring a lawsuit against the defendant in Switzerland.204 However, foreign 
absent class members who are subject to jurisdiction in the United 
States, for example because they are domiciled in the United States, are 
considered party to the class proceeding and therefore are bound by it.205 
However ingenious the Romy compromise may be, it remains to be 
seen whether civil law countries, particularly those without a class action 
device or those that adopted an opt-in class action, would recognize any 
opt-out class judgment issued by a foreign court, even one involving a 
purely American class. Romy’s proposal seems to conflate two different 
and independent obstacles to the recognition of opt-out class judgments. 
While her compromise removes the obstacle of the lack of jurisdiction 
over foreign absent class members, it does nothing to reduce the con-
cerns that an opt-out class procedure may be against the public policy of 
the recognizing country.206 The author’s compromise is consistent, how-
ever, with her own belief that opt-out class actions do not in principle 
violate the Swiss public order when all the members of the class are 
identified.207 
                                                                                                         
 200. See, e.g., Sturner, supra note 3, at 114 (discussing a case in which the State Dis-
trict Court of Stuttgart refused recognition of a U.S. class action judgment because the 
U.S. court did not have personal jurisdiction over foreign absent class members, accord-
ing to German law.). 
 201. See Romy, supra note 1, at 793–94. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See supra Part I.A. (Countries that Do Not Have Class Actions for Damages) & 
Part I.C. (Countries that Adopt an Opt-In Class Action). 
 207. See Romy, supra note 1, at 796–99 (stating that an opt-out class action judgment 
would violate Swiss public order whenever the class includes people who are not identi-
fied). 
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However well-intentioned the certification of a worldwide class action, 
there is the lingering concern that the United States views itself as a 
“Courthouse for the World” to right the wrongs committed all over the 
planet. Enforcing U.S. class actions worldwide may be thought to en-
courage “arrogant and imperialistic” American behavior208 which may 
even be viewed as an “intrusion into the internal social policies and cul-
tures of other sovereign states.”209 
Although this view of American egotism is not shared by all,210 the 
foregoing suggests that the most important exercise may not be to deter-
                                                                                                         
 208. See Richard O. Faulk, Armageddon Through Aggregation? The Use and Abuse of 
Class Actions in International Dispute Resolution, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 999, 1018 (2002) 
(“The political impact of enhancing the power of American jurisprudence in this manner 
is nothing less than imperialistic.”); Monestier, supra note 6, at 74 (“It is arrogant and 
imperialistic for U.S. courts to attempt to bind foreign claimants to a result reached in an 
action thousands of miles away that they had no knowledge of or control over.”); see also 
Peta Spender & Michael Tarlowski, Case Note, Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
Ltd.: Adventures on the Barbary Coast: Morrison and Enforcement in a Globalised Secu-
rities Market, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 280, 291–92 (2011) (discussing the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of U.S. courts in global securities class actions and the perceptions of the 
United States as security police or legal and economic imperialist). But see Morrison v. 
Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 175 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are an American court, 
not the world’s court, and we cannot and should not expend our resources resolving cases 
that do not affect Americans or involve fraud emanating from America.”). 
 209. See Faulk, supra note 208, at 1000. 
The use of U.S. [class actions] . . . to resolve claims of nonresident foreign liti-
gants represents a major intrusion into the internal social policies and cultures 
of other sovereign states. Although ‘globalism’ may be useful as a commercial 
cliché, its intrusion into jurisprudence is disturbing, especially when procedural 
devices that are not yet recognized internationally are used to resolve claims 
arising from conduct that occurs beyond the forum state’s borders. 
Id. 
 210. See Pinna, supra note 5, at 61 (concluding that, “because [European consumers] 
would not be able to benefit from the access to justice granted by US courts even against 
a non-[European] defendant. . . . [F]rom a policy perspective, refusing to recognize a US 
class action judgment is not a good solution for European countries.”); Seth A. Northrop, 
Note, Exporting Environmental Justice by Importing Claimants: The Suitability and Fea-
sibility of the Globalization of Mass Tort Class Actions, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 
779, 781, 803 (2006) (considering U.S. class action “a vehicle for otherwise voiceless 
plaintiffs to resist the exploitation at the hands of U.S.-based [multinational corpora-
tions]” and discussing the risk of impunity of U.S. corporations for their actions abroad); 
Buschkin, supra note 9, at 1588–93 (discussing the behavior of multinationals operating 
in a global economy that know that they are subject to class actions for their wrongdoing 
in the United States, but “a large portion of the globe is easy prey to their lucrative, but 
illegal, selling practices” and discussing the impact of that behavior in the U.S. market.) 
According to the author, 
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mine whether foreign courts might recognize and enforce U.S. class ac-
tion judgments and settlements against the interests of foreign class 
members. Rather, perhaps the most revealing analysis may be to deter-
mine whether U.S. courts are willing to recognize and enforce foreign 
class action judgments and settlements (or the generic collective redress 
alternatives indigenous to “exotic” legal systems) against the interests of 
American citizens that may have been included as foreign absent class 
members in these lawsuits.211 Indeed, American courts would look rather 
foolish if, after an established case law of consistent certification of for-
eign classes based primarily on the expectation that foreign courts would 
recognize U.S. class action judgments, American courts realize that they 
do not have the stomach to recognize foreign class action judgments 
against American defendants or American class members.212 
Two recent examples are particularly compelling.213 
                                                                                                         
[i]f foreign claimants are excluded from securities classes, everyone loses. For-
eign claimants suffer because they lose their investments, U.S. corporations 
suffer because it becomes more difficult to raise capital, and U.S. citizens suf-
fer as foreign investors pull their money out of U.S. financial markets and the 
economy declines as a result. 
Id. at 1593. 
 211. See Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 61. 
Until the United States is ready to contemplate a system in which even the 
claims of U.S. investors, based on U.S. trading, are subject to the laws of an-
other country, it is inappropriate to solve the problem of multiple proceedings 
by suggesting that they all take place in U.S. courts. 
Id. 
[T]he day will soon come when American courts will have to decide whether to 
give effect to class or other aggregate judgments rendered by foreign courts 
purporting to bind U.S. class members. Unless American courts are fully pre-
pared to enforce such foreign judgments, they would be wise to exhibit some 
restraint in assuming jurisdiction over foreign claimants in U.S. class actions. 
Monestier, supra note 6, at 75 n.260. 
 212. Naturally, this criticism is limited to the idea that U.S. courts must condition the 
certification of a foreign class to the expectation that foreign courts will recognize the 
U.S. class action judgment. 
 213. The class action case in Ecuador brought by indigenous people against Texaco 
(later Chevron) that led to an eighteen billion dollar verdict against Chevron is beyond 
the scope of this Article, because the issue there relates not to the binding nature of a 
class action judgment against absent class members, but against the class defendant. Suf-
fice it to remind that the class action was originally filed in the United States and dis-
missed on a forum non conveniens motion filed by the defendant, who demonstrated con-
fidence in the Ecuadorian judicial system and willingness to try the case there. This is 
commonly referred to as “forum shopper’s remorse.” See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. 
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In January 2012, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals approved a global 
class action settlement.214 The class included all non-U.S. class members 
that had been previously excluded from the corresponding U.S. securities 
class action titled Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd.215 The class action 
settlement was approved despite the facts that the cause of action had 
taken place outside the Netherlands,216 the defendant was a Swiss com-
pany,217 and only a small percentage of the class members were from the 
Netherlands.218 The Amsterdam court declared that the settlement was 
binding on all class members who did not opt out.219 This is more worri-
some for European than U.S. class members, because internal rules 
                                                                                                         
Supp. 2d 534, 545–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[T]he Court is satisfied on the basis of the re-
cord before it that the courts of Ecuador can exercise with respect to the parties and 
claims here presented that modicum of independence and impartiality necessary to an 
adequate alternative forum.”); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc. 847 F. Supp. 61, 64 (S.D. Tex. 
1994) (“[i]t is clear from the affidavits of two former Ecuadorian Supreme Court justices 
that an adequate forum is available in Ecuador . . . . Ecuador provides private remedies 
for tortious conduct and maintains an independent judicial system with adequate proce-
dural safeguards.”). But see Christopher Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum 
Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV 1444 
(2011). 
[U]nder existing law these seemingly inconsistent arguments are not necessar-
ily inconsistent at all. Due to differences between the forum non conveniens 
doctrine and the judgment enforcement doctrine, it is possible to argue consis-
tently that a foreign court is available, adequate, and more appropriate for dis-
missal purposes but suffers from inadequacies that preclude enforcement. 
Id. The authors also propose suggestions to avoid the access-to-justice gap created with 
this dubious strategy. For more on this topic see Lucien J. Dhooge, Aguinda v. Chevron-
texaco: Mandatory Grounds for the Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments for Environ-
mental Injury in the United States, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (2009–2010); Judith 
Kimerling, Transnational Operations, Bi-National Injustice: Chevrontexaco and Indige-
nous Huaorani and Kichwa in the Amazon Rainforest in Ecuador, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
445 (2006–2007). Disclaimer: the author of this Article has worked as a consultant in the 
litigation. 
 214. See STICHTING CONVERIUM SECURITIES COMPENSATION FOUND., 
http://www.converiumsettlement.com (last visited Apr. 25, 2012) [hereinafter 
CONVERIUM SETTLEMENT]. 
 215. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); CONVERIUM 
SETTLEMENT, supra note 214. 
 216. See CONVERIUM SETTLEMENT, supra note 214. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
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within the European Union make recognition of judgments difficult to 
evade.220 
Amsterdam is aggressively vying to establish itself as a hub for 
worldwide class action settlements.221 This is a particularly serious prob-
lem for European class members because of the ease with which Euro-
pean judgments are enforced throughout the European Union. Consider-
ing that the Netherlands has a settlement class action device but not the 
possibility of class-action litigation,222 it is more probable that the coun-
try will become a “judicial hellhole” in which class members’ claims will 
be sucked into.223 
In 2011, a Canadian court certified a class action including absent U.S. 
class members.224 This may suggest a potential problem because the 
threshold for bringing a class action in Canada is lower than the increas-
ingly stringent U.S. restrictions on class certification. For example, Ca-
nadian class action law correctly did not implement the number one kil-
ler of class actions in the United States: the predominance requirement. 
Moreover, its requirement that the class action must be a “preferable” 
procedure is less demanding than the number two killer of class actions 
                                                                                                         
 220. See Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters, EC, Dec. 21, 2007, 2007 O.J. (L 339); Council 
Regulation 44/2001, Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, 2000 O.J. (L 12) (EC). 
 221. Other legal markets will gladly compete with Amsterdam for a share of the inter-
national legal business that the United States may have discarded after Morrison. See 
Spender & Tarlowski, supra note 208, at 280, 314 (discussing Morrison from an interna-
tional perspective and predicting that Australia could attract transnational class litigation 
in the aftermath of Morrison: “It is very likely that Morrison will have a centrifugal effect 
on transnational securities litigation, and securities class actions may flow to jurisdictions 
that have adopted the opt-out procedure. One consequence of this might be that more 
securities class actions will be commenced in Australia.”). 
 222. See supra notes 113–19 and accompanying text (describing and critiquing the 
Dutch Collective Settlement of Mass Damage Act). 
 223. See Nagareda, supra note 2, at 41 (“The remaining question is whether Amster-
dam ultimately will emerge as the trans-Atlantic successor to anomalous state courts 
within the United States—as a kind of procedural ‘red-light district’ for aggregate deal-
making, like its namesake for other transactions pursued by consenting parties.”). 
 224. Compare Silver v. Imax Corp., 2011 ONSC 1035 (Can.) (a Canadian class action 
including absent U.S. claimants), with McCann v. CP Ships Ltd., [2009] O.J. No. 5182 
(Ont. Can. S.C.J.) (QL) (excluding non-Canadian class members in the class, even those 
that had purchased their shares in Canada) and McKenna v. Gammon Gold Inc., 2010 
ONSC 1591, ¶¶ 96–110, 115–18 (Can.) (same). See generally Tanya J. Monestier, Is 
Canada the New ‘Shangri-La’ of Global Securities Class Actions?, 32 NW J. INT’L LAW 
& BUS. (forthcoming 2012) (“Imax is truly the first case of its kind in this respect—never 
before has a global class of claimants on such a large scale been certified in a Canadian 
court.”). 
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in the United States: the requirement of “superiority.”225 Therefore, 
American plaintiff class action attorneys may try to bypass the more 
stringent Rule 23 prerequisites established by a conservative federal ju-
diciary by simply crossing the border and filing the same class action a 
few hundred miles to the north. After that, they would only need to bring 
the judgment back south and enforce it in the same federal court that had 
denied class certification months before.226 
C. Formal Notice through Rogatory Letters is Essential 
Finally, even if it were possible for a U.S. court to acquire personal ju-
risdiction over Latin American nationals with no contacts with the 
United States,227 and even if it were possible to provide adequate notice 
                                                                                                         
 225. See Garry D. Watson, Class Actions: The Canadian Experience, 11 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 269, 272–73 (2001) (stating that “[i]n certain respects the Canadian 
legislation is more liberal in facilitating class actions than its American counterpart” and 
that “[t]he Canadian criteria for certification of a proceeding as a class action are rela-
tively undemanding.”) (citations omitted); BRANCH, supra note 135, at 4.870 (stating that 
the “preferable” standard is a lower threshold for certification than “superiority”); 
DEFENDING CLASS ACTIONS IN CANADA, supra note 135, at 13, 14, 30–32, 116, 157, 158, 
163, 177 (stating that certification in Canadian class actions is a simpler and less onerous 
process than in the United States and that the requirements that correspond to numerosity, 
typicality, and predominance are “generally less burdensome for plaintiffs.” The author 
also states that certain claims that might not satisfy the typicality and predominance re-
quirements of U.S. class action law may satisfy the Canadian class action requirements. 
The author also cites class actions that have been certified “despite a finding that individ-
ual issues predominated over common issues.” Even in Quebec, the only Canadian prov-
ince that adopted the predominance requirement, such requirement is less restrictive than 
in the United States.). It is symptomatic of the Canadian approach to class actions that the 
Ontario Law Reform Commission carefully considered and expressly rejected the pre-
dominance requirement. See ONT. LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 132, at 344–47. The 
Report states that the predominance requirement of U.S. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 
has served to prevent the successful assertion of many class action in various 
substantive law areas . . . . notwithstanding the arguments of commentators and 
some courts that such actions are, indeed, appropriate for class treatment . . . . 
Accordingly, we believe that the commonality threshold test for class actions 
should not be too onerous. 
Id.; see also Gidi, The Class Action Code, supra note 22, at 39–40 (not adopting the pre-
dominance prerequisite in article 3 of the code). 
 226. See Gidi, Issue Preclusion, supra note 55, at 1028–56 (discussing whether an 
order denying class certification has issue preclusive effect in other courts). 
 227. See supra Part II.B. (A U.S. Court Cannot Validly Obtain Personal Jurisdiction 
over Foreign Absent Plaintiff Class Members) (arguing that U.S. courts cannot acquire 
personal jurisdiction over Latin American nationals with no contact with the United 
States). 
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to Latin American nationals,228 most Latin American countries would 
still refuse to recognize and enforce U.S. class action judgments and set-
tlements. 
The final obstacle lies in the notice to class members. Similarl to what 
was discussed above regarding personal jurisdiction,229 the rules of serv-
ice of process are usually addressed from the point of view of the defen-
dant. However, in the case of absent class members, it is necessary to 
notify them of the class action proceeding and of their right to opt out or 
to participate in the proceeding.230 Whether a simple notice is sufficient 
or whether a formal service of process is necessary, absent class mem-
bers located outside the United States must be informed through interna-
tionally acceptable means. 
Most Latin American countries will not accept as adequate notice to 
their domiciliaries anything short of service by rogatory letter as a pre-
requisite to recognizing or enforcing a foreign judgment.231 A simple no-
tice, as is required under Rule 23,232 is insufficient, even if it could be 
legally adequate. It is not that these countries do not know the concept of 
notice by publication or by mail in domestic litigation. But the require-
ments of notice in international litigation are a completely different mat-
ter. 
CONCLUSION 
A judgment or court-approved settlement in a U.S. class action for 
damages would not be recognized or enforced in Latin American coun-
tries. The reasons have to do not only with the peculiarities of the class 
action device in each Latin American country, but also with adequate 
                                                                                                         
 228. See supra Part II.A. (Class Action Notice Would Be Inadequate) (arguing that 
class action notice would not be adequate). 
 229. See supra Part II.B. (A U.S. Court Cannot Validly Obtain Personal Jurisdiction 
over Foreign Absent Plaintiff Class Members). 
 230. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985); see supra 
note 196. 
 231. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f) and corresponding state court rules, for example, MASS. 
R. CIV. P. 4(e), MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04. See also Inter-American Convention on Letters 
Rogatory, arts. 4–13, Jan. 30, 1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 43, 1483 U.N.T.S. 288; Hague Con-
vention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and 
Commercial Matters arts. 5, 8–11, 15–16, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 
361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 (entered into force Feb. 10, 1969); Sturner, supra note 3, at 111–
13 (stating that Germany would require individual service of process in “strict compli-
ance with the provisions of the Hague Service Convention” and that notice by publication 
would probably not be allowed). 
 232. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). 
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notice, personal jurisdiction, and the requirement of international notice 
by rogatory letter. 
One of the many reasons why so many transnational class actions are 
brought in the United States is because there is a worldwide dearth of 
entrepreneurial plaintiff class action attorneys.233 However, with the 
rapid proliferation of the class action device in Latin America, Europe, 
and Asia, litigants will soon have to face the enforceability, in the United 
States, of foreign class action judgments or settlements. This Article pos-
its that American courts, American defendants, American class members, 
and American entrepreneurial plaintiff class action attorneys will readily 
come to the conclusion that foreign courts have no business deciding 
matters that are of the exclusive interest of American class members. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                         
 233. A few other reasons are the existence of discovery, contingency fees, punitive 
damages, and the opt-out class action device itself in the U.S. legal system. For a broad 
discussion of Comparative Civil Procedure, see UGO A. MATTEI, TEEMU RUSKOLA & 
ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW 489–563, 684–706, 707–828, 855–62 
(2009). See also JAMES R. MAXEINER, FAILURES OF AMERICAN CIVIL JUSTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2011) (comparing civil law and American civil procedure 
from a critical perspective). 
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APPENDIX234 
Argentina. National Constitution235 
Artículo 43. Toda persona puede interponer acción expedita y rápida 
de amparo, siempre que no exista otro medio judicial más idóneo, contra 
todo acto u omisión de autoridades públicas o de particulares, que en 
forma actual o inminente lesione, restrinja, altere o amenace, con 
arbitrariedad o ilegalidad manifiesta, derechos y garantías reconocidos 
por esta Constitución, un tratado o una ley. En el caso, el juez podrá 
declarar la inconstitucionalidad de la norma en que se funde el acto u 
omisión lesiva. 
Podrán interponer esta acción contra cualquier forma de discriminación 
y en lo relativo a los derechos que protegen al ambiente, a la 
competencia, al usuario y al consumidor, así como a los derechos de 
incidencia colectiva en general, el afectado, el defensor del pueblo y las 
asociaciones que propendan a esos fines, registradas conforme a la ley, la 
que determinará los requisitos y formas de su organización. 
Argentina. Law 24240 of Consumer Protection (amended 2008)236 
Artículo 54.  . . . La sentencia que haga lugar a la pretensión hará cosa 
juzgada para el demandado y para todos los consumidores o usuarios que 
se encuentren en similares condiciones, excepto de aquellos que 
manifiesten su voluntad en contrario previo a la sentencia en los términos 
y condiciones que el magistrado disponga. 
Argentina. Law 25675 General Environmental Law237 
Artículo 33. Los dictámenes emitidos por organismos del Estado sobre 
daño ambiental, agregados al proceso, tendrán la fuerza probatoria de los 
informes periciales, sin perjuicio del derecho de las partes a su 
impugnación. La sentencia hará cosa juzgada y tendrá efecto erga omnes, 
a excepción de que la acción sea rechazada, aunque sea parcialmente, por 
cuestiones probatorias. 
                                                                                                         
 234. Some statutes below have been heavily edited to include only the excerpts that are 
relevant to the arguments developed in this argument about the enforceability of a U.S. 
class action judgment or court-approved class action settlement. 
 235. Art. 43, CONST. NAC. (Arg.). 
 236. Law No. 26361, Apr. 3, 2008, [3] B.O. 1378, amending Law No. 24240, art. 54 
(Arg.). 
 237. Ley General del Ambiente, Law No. 25675, Nov. 6, 2002, B.O. 28–11–2002, art. 
33 (Buenos Aires, Arg.). 
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Argentina. Conclusions of the Mendoza Conference (2005)238 
9. Ha de regularse la extensión subjetiva de los efectos de la cosa 
juzgada erga omnes, excepto cuando la pretensión fuera rechazada por 
insuficiencia de pruebas, en cuyo caso la cosa juzgada será meramente 
formal, pudiendo cualquier legitimado intentar otra acción, con idéntico 
fundamento, valiéndose de nueva prueba. 
Asimismo, en la hipótesis de rechazo basado en las pruebas 
producidas, cualquier legitimado podrá intentar otra acción, con idéntico 
fundamento, cuando sugiere nueva prueba sobreviviente que no hubiera 
podido ser producida en el proceso. El reexamen por cuestiones 
probatorias no podrá fundarse en nuevas tecnologías, ni en supuestos que 
habiliten la revisión de la cosa juzgada. 
Brazil. Law 8078, Consumer Code (enacted 1990)239 
Artigo 103. Nas ações coletivas de que trata este código, a sentença fa-
rá coisa julgada: 
I - erga omnes, exceto se o pedido for julgado improcedente por insufi-
ciência de provas, hipótese em que qualquer legitimado poderá intentar 
outra ação, com idêntico fundamento valendo-se de nova prova, na hipó-
tese do inciso I do parágrafo único do art. 81; 
II - ultra partes, mas limitadamente ao grupo, categoria ou classe, salvo 
improcedência por insuficiência de provas, nos termos do inciso anterior, 
quando se tratar da hipótese prevista no inciso II do parágrafo único do 
art. 81; 
III - erga omnes, apenas no caso de procedência do pedido, para bene-
ficiar todas as vítimas e seus sucessores, na hipótese do inciso III do pa-
rágrafo único do art. 81.240 
§ 1° Os efeitos da coisa julgada previstos nos incisos I e II não prejudi-
carão interesses e direitos individuais dos integrantes da coletividade, do 
grupo, categoria ou classe. 
§ 2° Na hipótese prevista no inciso III, em caso de improcedência do 
pedido, os interessados que não tiverem intervindo no processo como 
litisconsortes poderão propor ação de indenização a título individual. 
                                                                                                         
 238. XXIII Congreso National de Derecho Procesal [XXIII National Congress of Pro-
cedural Law], Mendoza, Arg., Sept. 22–24, 2005, Conclusiones, para. 9. 
 239. Lei No. 8078, de 11 de setembro de 1990, D.O.U. de 11.9.1990 (Braz.). The Bra-
zilian legislation is extensive. See, e.g., Lei No. 7.347, de 24 de julho de 1985, D.O.U. de 
25.7.1985 (Braz.). 
 240. There is no significant difference between the Latin expressions erga omnes 
(against all) and ultra partes (beyond the parties). Both mean that the class decree binds 
all absent members of the class, with the qualification that the decision cannot prejudice 
their individual rights. See Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil, supra note 36, at 387–88. 
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§ 3° Os efeitos da coisa julgada de que cuida o art. 16, combinado com 
o art. 13 da Lei n° 7.347, de 24 de julho de 1985, não prejudicarão as 
ações de indenização por danos pessoalmente sofridos, propostas indivi-
dualmente ou na forma prevista neste código, mas, se procedente o pedi-
do, beneficiarão as vítimas e seus sucessores, que poderão proceder à 
liquidação e à execução, nos termos dos arts. 96 a 99. . . . 
Chile. Law 19.496, Consumer Protection Law (amended 2004)241 
Artículo 54. La sentencia ejecutoriada que declare la responsabilidad 
del o los demandados producirá efecto erga omnes, con excepción de 
aquellos procesos que no hayan podido acumularse conforme al número 
2) del inciso final del artículo 53, y de los casos en que se efectúe la 
reserva de derechos que admite el mismo artículo. 
La sentencia será dada a conocer para que todos aquellos que hayan 
sido perjudicados por los mismos hechos puedan reclamar el cobro de las 
indemnizaciones o el cumplimiento de las reparaciones que 
correspondan. 
Si se ha rechazado la demanda cualquier legitimado activo podrá 
interponer, dentro del plazo de prescripción de la acción, ante el mismo 
tribunal y valiéndose de nuevas circunstancias, una nueva acción, 
entendiéndose suspendida la prescripción a su favor por todo el plazo 
que duró el juicio colectivo. El tribunal declarará encontrarse frente a 
nuevas circunstancias junto con la declaración de admisibilidad de la 
acción dispuesta en el artículo 52. 
Colombia. Law 472 Class Action Law (enacted August 5, 1998)242 
Artículo 56. Exclusión del grupo. Dentro de los cinco (5) días 
siguientes al vencimiento del término de traslado de la demanda, 
cualquier miembro de un mismo grupo podrá manifestar su deseo de ser 
excluido del grupo y, en consecuencia, no ser vinculado por el acuerdo 
de conciliación o la sentencia. Un miembro del grupo no quedará 
vinculado a los efectos de la sentencia en dos situaciones: 
a) Cuando se haya solicitado en forma expresa la exclusión del grupo 
en el término previsto en el inciso anterior; 
b) Cuando la persona vinculada por una sentencia pero que no 
participó en el proceso, demuestre en el mismo término que sus intereses 
no fueron representados en forma adecuada por el representante del 
grupo o que hubo graves errores en la notificación. 
                                                                                                         
 241. Law No. 19496, Marzo 7, 1997, D.O., art. 54 (Chile). 
 242. L. 472, agosto 6, 1998, D.O. 43.357, arts. 56, 61, 66 (Colom.). The Colombian 
Law 472 is extensive, with eighty-six rules written in several dozen pages. 
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Transcurrido el término sin que el miembro así lo exprese, los 
resultados del acuerdo o de la sentencia lo vincularán. Si decide excluirse 
del grupo, podrá intentar acción individual por indemnización de 
perjuicios. 
Artículo 61. Diligencia de conciliación. De oficio el juez, dentro de los 
cinco (5) días siguientes al vencimiento del término que tienen los 
miembros del grupo demandante para solicitar su exclusión del mismo, 
deberá convocar a una diligencia de conciliación con el propósito de 
lograr un acuerdo entre las partes, que constará por escrito. . . . El 
acuerdo entre las partes se asimilará a una sentencia y tendrá los efectos 
que para ella se establecen en esta ley. El acta de conciliación que 
contenga el acuerdo hace tránsito a cosa juzgada y presta mérito 
ejecutivo. 
Artículo 66. Efectos de la sentencia. La sentencia tendrá efectos de 
cosa juzgada en relación con quienes fueron parte del proceso y de las 
personas que, perteneciendo al grupo interesado no manifestaron 
oportuna y expresamente su decisión de excluirse del grupo y de las 
resultas del proceso. 
Costa Rica. Code of Administrative Procedure (enacted 2008)243 
Artículo 48 inc. 5) La sentencia dictada en este proceso - intereses de 
grupo, corporativos, difusos o procesos grupales - de conformidad con 
las reglas establecidas en el presente Código, producirá con su firmeza, 
cosa juzgada material respecto de todas las partes que haya concurrido en 
él. 
Costa Rica. Bill 15979, Proposed Code of Civil Procedure (published 
2010)244 
Artículo 128. Efectos de la sentencia. Los efectos de las sentencias que 
se dicten en procesos para la tutela de intereses supraindividuales, se re-
girán por las siguientes disposiciones: 
1) En tutela de intereses difusos, tendrá efecto de cosa juzgada material 
respecto de cualquier persona, salvo que la demanda se declare sin lugar 
por insuficiencia de pruebas. No se perjudicarán las acciones de indem-
nización por daños personalmente sufridos, reclamados individualmente, 
pero si la demanda es declarada con lugar beneficiará a las víctimas y a 
                                                                                                         
 243. CÓDIGO PROCESAL CONSTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO, Ley No. 8508 de 4 de abril 
de 2006, art. 48 (Costa Rica). 
 244. Proyecto de Codigo General, Expediente No. 15979, de 11 de agosto de 2005, art. 
128 (Costa Rica). 
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sus sucesores, que podrán proceder a la liquidación en la etapa de ejecu-
ción. 
2) En tutela de intereses colectivos, tendrá efectos de cosa juzgada ma-
terial respecto de quienes no hayan figurado como parte, pero limitada-
mente al grupo, categoría o clase, salvo improcedencia por insuficiente 
de pruebas. Los efectos de cosa juzgada que aquí se establecen, quedan 
limitados al plano colectivo, no perjudicando intereses individuales. 
3) Tratándose de intereses individuales homogéneos, tendrá efecto de 
cosa juzgada material respecto de cualquier persona afectada, cuando se 
declare con lugar la demanda. Si fuere desestimatoria, los interesados no 
litigantes podrán demandar a título individual. 
4) Los sujetos no litigantes a quienes se extiendan los efectos de una 
sentencia estimatoria, deberán hacer valer sus derechos en ejecución del 
proceso para la tutela de intereses supraindividuales. 
5) Los efectos de cosa juzgada que aquí se establecen, quedan limita-
dos al plano colectivo, no perjudicando intereses individuales. 
6) En las relaciones jurídicas continuadas, si sobreviniera modificación 
en el estado de hecho o de derecho, la parte podrá pedir la revisión de lo 
que fue decidido por sentencia. 
7) Cuando la demanda hubiere sido denegada, con base en las pruebas 
producidas, cualquier legitimado podrá intentar una acción, con idéntico 
fundamento, cuando surgiere prueba nueva, sobreviniente, que no podía 
haber sido producida en el proceso. 
Mexico. Federal Code of Civil Procedure (amended 2011)245 
Artículo 594. Los miembros de la colectividad afectada podrán 
adherirse a la acción de que se trate, conforme a las reglas establecidas 
en este artículo. 
En el caso de las acciones colectivas en sentido estricto e individuales 
homogéneas, la adhesión a su ejercicio podrá realizarse por cada 
individuo que tenga una afectación a través de una comunicación expresa 
por cualquier medio dirigida al representante a que se refiere el artículo 
585 de este Código o al representante legal de la parte actora, según sea 
el caso. 
Los afectados podrán adherirse voluntariamente a la colectividad 
durante la substanciación del proceso y hasta dieciocho meses 
posteriores a que la sentencia haya causado estado o en su caso, el 
convenio judicial adquiera la calidad de cosa juzgada. 
Dentro de este lapso, el interesado hará llegar su consentimiento 
expreso y simple al representante, quien a su vez lo presentará al juez. El 
                                                                                                         
 245. CFPC art. 594, as amended, DO, 30 de Agosto de 2011 (Mex.). 
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juez proveerá sobre la adhesión y, en su caso, ordenará el inicio del 
incidente de liquidación que corresponda a dicho interesado. 
Los afectados que se adhieran a la colectividad durante la 
substanciación del proceso, promoverán el incidente de liquidación en 
los términos previstos en el artículo 605 de este Código. 
Los afectados que se adhieran posteriormente a que la sentencia haya 
causado estado o, en su caso, el convenio judicial adquiera la calidad de 
cosa juzgada, deberán probar el daño causado en el incidente respectivo. 
A partir de que el juez determine el importe a liquidar, el miembro de la 
colectividad titular del derecho al cobro tendrá un año para ejercer el 
mismo. 
En tratándose de la adhesión voluntaria, la exclusión que haga 
cualquier miembro de la colectividad posterior al emplazamiento del 
demandado, equivaldrá a un desistimiento de la acción colectiva, por lo 
que no podrá volver a participar en un procedimiento colectivo derivado 
de o por los mismos hechos. 
Tratándose de acciones colectivas en sentido estricto e individuales 
homogéneas sólo tendrán derecho al pago que derive de la condena, las 
personas que formen parte de la colectividad y prueben en el incidente de 
liquidación, haber sufrido el daño causado. 
El representante a que se refiere el artículo 585 de este Código tendrá 
los poderes más amplios que en derecho procedan con las facultades 
especiales que requiera la ley para sustanciar el procedimiento y para 
representar a la colectividad y a cada uno de sus integrantes que se hayan 
adherido o se adhieran a la acción. 
Panama. Law 45 (2007)246 
Artículo 129. Reglas Procesales. El ejercicio de las acciones de clase, 
en materia de consumo, corresponde a uno o más miembros de un grupo 
o clase de personas que han sufrido un daño o perjuicio derivado de un 
producto o servicio. Tal ejercicio se entiende en beneficio del respectivo 
grupo o clase de personas. La Autoridad, las asociaciones de 
consumidores organizados o un grupo de consumidores que nombre un 
representante están legitimados para demandar. 
Las acciones de clase se rigen de acuerdo con las siguientes reglas: 
El miembro de la clase que desee excluirse podrá hacerlo antes de que 
se fije fecha para la audiencia preliminar. 
7. Las transacciones quedan sujetas a la aprobación del juez, quien 
velará por que los derechos concedidos en la presente Ley queden 
debidamente protegidos. 
                                                                                                         
 246. Ley 45, de 31 de Octobre de 2007, art. 129 (Pan.). 
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8. La sentencia afectará a todos los miembros que pertenezcan a la 
clase, aunque no hayan intervenido en el proceso. 
Panama. Law 29 (1996)247 
Artículo 172. Reglas Procesales. El ejercicio de las acciones de clase 
corresponden a uno o más miembros, de un grupo o clase de personas 
que han sufrido un daño o perjuicio derivado de un bien o producto; tal 
ejercicio se entiende en beneficio del respectivo grupo o clase de 
personas. La Comisión y las asociaciones de consumidores organizadas 
están legitimadas para demandar. Las acciones de clase se rigen de 
acuerdo con las siguientes reglas: 
1. Uno o varios miembros de una clase podrán demandar, como 
representantes de todos los miembros de la clase, en cualquiera de los 
siguientes casos: si el grupo fuere tan numeroso que la acumulación de 
todos los miembros resultare impracticable; si existieren cuestiones de 
hecho o de derecho común al grupo; si las pretensiones de los 
representantes fueren típicas de las reclamaciones de la clase; si las 
reclamaciones, de tratarse separadamente, fueren susceptibles de 
sentencia, incongruentes y divergentes; si las reclamaciones, de tratarse 
individualmente, resultaren ilusorias; 
3. El tribunal, al acoger la demanda, la fijará en lista y publicará edicto 
por cinco (5) días consecutivos en un diario de reconocida circulación 
nacional, para que, en el término de diez (10) días, contados a partir de 
su última publicación, el demandante y todas las personas pertenecientes 
al grupo comparezcan a hacer valer sus derechos, a formular argumentos 
o a participar en el proceso. Una vez surtido su trámite, se procederá a la 
notificación de la demanda; 
5. Mediante la presentación de poderes al tribunal, a favor del abogado 
que promovió la demanda, o de un apoderado de su elección, el 
interviniste se adhiere a la demanda, asumiendo con ello la obligación de 
cubrir los honorarios correspondientes, conforme lo señale el juez, que se 
pagarán de acuerdo con la cuantía de la condena; 
6. La sentencia afectará a todos los demandantes que pertenezcan a 
dicho grupo, aunque no hayan intervenido en el proceso; 
7. Las partes que no hubieren comparecido como terceros, podrán 
formular sus reclamaciones en la fase de ejecución, mediante el 
procedimiento de liquidación previsto en los artículos 983, 984 y 985 del 
Código Judicial, y obtener la indemnización correspondiente; 
                                                                                                         
 247. Ley 29, de 1 de Febrero de 1996, art. 172 (Pan.). 
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Panama. Judicial Code (amended in 2008)248 
1421-I. Si hubiera un gran número de actores o demandados, el 
tribunal podrá consolidar las acciones utilizado su discreción en 
implementar medidas prácticas para que el caso se desarrolle con 
rapidez, dentro de los límites del debido proceso. La prueba que sea 
común a las partes podrá producirse una sola vez, para evitar repeticiones 
inútiles. 
En estos procesos podrán intervenir terceros coadyuvantes por hechos 
ocurridos en el extranjero, que guarden conexión con los hechos o las 
partes en la demanda instaurada en Panamá, aunque los efectos de 
aquellos hechos no se hubieran producido en Panamá. 
Cuando se lesionen derechos subjetivos individuales, provenientes de 
origen común y tengan como titulares a los miembros de un grupo, 
categoría o clase, los afectados, los colectivos de afectados o las 
organizaciones no gubernamentales constituidos para la defensa de 
derecho colectivos estarán legitimados para promover la acción en 
defensa de los derechos individuales homogéneos. 
Peru. Code of Civil Procedure (enacted 1995, amended 2002)249 
Artículo 82. Patrocinio de intereses difusos. Interés difuso es aquel 
cuya titularidad corresponde a un conjunto indeterminado de personas, 
respecto de bienes de inestimable valor patrimonial, tales como el medio 
ambiente o el patrimonio cultural o histórico o del consumidor. 
Pueden promover o intervenir en este proceso, el Ministerio Público, 
los Gobiernos Regionales, los Gobiernos Locales, las Comunidades 
Campesinas y/o las Comunidades Nativas en cuya jurisdicción se 
produjo el daño ambiental o al patrimonio cultural y las asociaciones o 
instituciones sin fines de lucro que según la Ley y criterio del Juez, este 
último por resolución debidamente motivada, estén legitimadas para ello. 
En estos casos, una síntesis de la demanda será publicada en el Diario 
Oficial El Peruano o en otro que publique los avisos judiciales del 
correspondiente distrito judicial. Son aplicables a los procesos sobre 
intereses difusos, las normas sobre acumulación subjetiva de 
pretensiones en lo que sea pertinente. 
En caso que la sentencia no ampare la demanda, será elevada en 
consulta a la Corte Superior. La sentencia definitiva que declare fundada 
la demanda, será obligatoria además para quienes no hayan participado 
del proceso. 
                                                                                                         
 248. Ley 32, de 1 de Agosto de 2006, art. 1421-I (Pan.). 
 249. CÓD. PROC. CIV., Law No. 10 de 1 de agosto de 1993, art. 82.6 (Peru). 
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La indemnización que se establezca en la sentencia, deberá ser 
entregada a las Municipalidades Distrital o Provincial que hubieran 
intervenido en el proceso, a fin de que la emplee en la reparación del 
daño ocasionado o la conservación del medio ambiente de su 
circunscripción. 
Uruguay. General Code of Procedure (enacted 1998)250 
Artículo 220. Efectos de la cosa juzgada en procesos promovidos en 
representación de intereses difusos. La sentencia dictada en procesos 
promovidos en defensa de intereses difusos (artículo 42) tendrá eficacia 
general, salvo si fuere absolutoria por ausencia de pruebas, en cuyo caso, 
otro legitimado podrá volver a plantear la cuestión en otro proceso. 
Venezuela. Consumer Protection Law251 
Artículo 80. Acciones individuales o colectivas. La defensa de los 
derechos establecidos en esta Ley podrá ser ejercida tanto a título 
individual como colectivo. Podrá ser ejercida colectivamente cuando se 
encuentren involucrados intereses o derechos colectivos o difusos. 
El reclamo administrativo de indemnización por parte de todos los 
representados colectivamente podrá negociarse también de manera 
colectiva o individual, según sean los intereses de los representados. 
                                                                                                         
 250. CÓDIGO GENERAL DEL PROCESO, art. 220 (1998) (Uru.). 
 251. Ley No. 37.930 de Protección al consumidor y al usuario, de 4 de mayo de 2004, 
art. 80 (Venez.). 
